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ABSTRACT

Governments across the world regularly invoke sovereignty
to demand that the international community "mind its own
business" while they commit human rights abuses. They
proclaim that the sovereign right to be free from international
intervention in domestic affairs permits them unfettered
discretion within their territory. This Article seeks to challenge
those proclamations by resort to sovereignty in the people, a
time-honored principle that is typically more rhetorical than
substantive. Relying on classical interpretationsof sovereignty,
this Article infuses substance into the concept of sovereignty in
the people to recognize that a government is entitled to sovereign
rights only as the legitimate representative of the people and
only as long as it fulfills its duties to them. The Article then
examines the conditions that must be met for a government to
claim sovereign rights, as well as how and by whom access to
these rights should be determined. Taken to its logical
conclusion, sovereignty in the people establishes that (1)
sovereign rights can be lost when governments commit less than
the most egregious human rights abuses, which differentiates
this from the responsibility to protect; and (2) any form of
government is at risk of losing these rights, including
democracies.

Hallie Ludsin is the Research Director at the South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Centre in New Delhi, India. This Article was originally written for the
Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where the author served as a
legal consultant. Thank you to Rohan Edrisinha, Asanga Welikala, Ravi Nair, Marius
Pieterse, Kiran Kothari, and Ravi Nessman for their insightful comments on this
Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Governments often invoke a claim of sovereignty to avoid
international scrutiny of their human rights abuses. They angrily
denounce conditions on international relations intended to influence
them to stop their violations as breaches of sovereignty. Rather than
change their behavior, they proclaim that their sovereignty serves as
an impenetrable barrier permitting them unfettered discretion within
their territory. Most credible institutions, politicians, academics, and
policymakers do not believe that sovereignty leads to this
unregulated discretion, yet these proclamations serve as strong
rhetoric that the international community should "mind its own
business," other than in the most egregious cases. This Article seeks
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to challenge this rhetoric by resorting to a different type of
sovereignty-sovereignty in the people.
Constitutions throughout the world declare that sovereignty lies
with the people, yet the declaration often grants no real rights and
does nothing to check the power of governments to control, rather
than represent, the people. Infused with substance, however,
"sovereignty in the people" could act as a powerful tool to promote
accountability and minority rights. Taken to its logical conclusion, the
concept establishes that (1) governments can lose sovereign authority
even when they commit less than the most egregious human rights
abuses, and (2) any form of government is at risk of losing this
authority, including democracies-two notions that are likely to be
highly contentious.'
Part II of this Article provides the background necessary for
understanding the meaning of sovereignty. It examines sovereignty
as a mechanism for organizing domestic and international politics to
protect and enhance the security and common good of the people and
considers the challenges to and development of the concept. Relying
on classical interpretations of sovereignty and its historical
development, Part III articulates a substance-infused concept of
sovereignty in the people that identifies the people as the true
sovereign and recognizes that the government is entitled to exercise
the rights of sovereignty only as the representative of the people. In
addition to describing the theory, Part III examines how the

1.
The focus of the bulk of the literature on humanitarian intervention is on
the question of whether military intervention for gross violations of human rights
violates traditional notions of sovereignty. Peter A. Jenkins, The Economic Community
of West African States and the Regional Use of Force, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 333,
334 (2007); Tyra Ruth Saechao, Note, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility To
Protect: From Chaos to Clarity, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 663, 672 (2007). The fact that the
literature rarely delves past the scenario of military intervention for mass atrocities
when questioning whether to "violate" sovereignty suggests that sovereignty remains
intact for violations that are less than "massive" or "egregious."
The international community and debates about humanitarian action typically
equate the need to stop human rights violations with the need to ensure democracy
within a society. See Kenneth Anderson, HumanitarianInviolability in Crisis: The
Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the
2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 41, 42-43 (2004)
(discussing the difficulty of balancing the neutrality of human rights workers with the
non-neutral act of government building). This reflects what seems to be an assumption
that democracies do not commit human rights violations worthy of international
intervention. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, PoliticalIdeology as a Religion: The Idolatry of
Democracy, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 117, 143 (2006) (describing
the emergence of "[a] dogma ... that democratic societies irrefutably are just societies
in much the same way that religionists deem their cohorts to be good"); Eric A. Posner,
InternationalLaw: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 504 (2006) (explicitly
setting up his argument with the premise that the democratic states he is discussing
look after the welfare of their people). This assumption is unfair to members of
democratic societies living under a tyranny of the majority, a point discussed fully in
Part IV.
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international community's response to Libya's Arab Spring,
particularly the lead up to UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and
1973, lends nascent support to the content-infused concept of
"sovereignty in the people" advocated here.
Throughout Parts II and III, this Article assumes that "the
people" constitute a united and homogeneous political community
within the territory of a state. Part IV challenges this assumption by
examining who comprises the people and how their will and common
good should be determined in heterogeneous societies. It relies on
examples from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India, and France to show
how the people and democracies can run afoul of the requirements for
receiving sovereign rights.
Importantly, this Article's conception of sovereignty in the people
does not change the overall structure of international intervention in
the affairs of states. Rather, it justifies current practice in response to
human rights atrocities that trigger the responsibility to protect,
while providing a coherent conceptual framework for countering the
"mind your own business" attitudes of governments committing less
than the most egregious human rights violations.

II. UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY

One of the most difficult aspects of a discussion about
sovereignty is defining the term. The difficulty lies in the fact that the
concept has been evolving over hundreds of years and has been
appropriated at different times for purposes not necessarily
consistent with current usage. 2 The term has been used, for example,
to claim unlimited control over a territory and people, to describe the
independence of a country, to proclaim the self-determination of a
people, to describe the legitimacy of a government, to express
3
recognition of a state, and to claim government competencies. As one
scholar explains, "Because the idea of sovereignty has evolved

2.
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and
Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) ("The meaning of
'sovereignty' is confused and its uses are various."); Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the
Threads of Westphalia: "InvoluntarySovereignty Waiver"-Revolutionary International
Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 361, 369 (2005) ('Sovereignty' is a fluid concept. It is also an evolutionary concept,
expanding and contracting over time, depending to a large extent on the meaning with
which powerful states allow it to be infused."); Fr~d6ric Gilles Sourgens, Positivism,
Humanism, and Hegemony: Sovereignty and Security for Our Time, 25 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REV. 433, 434 (2006) ("Conceptions of sovereignty were the functional answer to the
political power struggles of their day.").
Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of
3.
Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 143-45 (2004).
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profoundly over history, it is surely quixotic to search for a definition
that captures every usage since the thirteenth century."4
Instead of trying to define the term, this Article examines
sovereignty as a mechanism for organizing domestic and
international politics to protect and enhance the security and
common go6d of the individuals who form a political community.5 The
concept of sovereignty developed to avoid the chaos and violence of
individuals asserting their own interests, often violently and at the
expense of others.6 As is discussed more thoroughly in Part III.A
below, these individuals united as a political community to create a
sovereign representative capable of organizing the interests and
needs of a population in order to avoid the violence. The international
rules of sovereignty developed for much the same reason-to prevent
a disorganized international system from permitting leaders or rulers
to promote their interests by attacking territory under the control of
another authority.7 Examining sovereignty as a set of organizational
rules comports with its conceptual development.
Four rules of international law are associated with a claim of
sovereignty, which can be made only by states.8 States rely on these
rules as their defensive shield against interference in their domestic
politics, including against criticism of their human rights abuses. The
rules protect two different types of sovereignty-internal and
external. Internal sovereignty permits the sovereign authority,
conceived of as the government, to act freely within the territory of its

4.
Daniel Philpott, Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty, in STATE
SOVEREIGNTY CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15, 17 (Sohail
H. Hashmi ed., 1997).
5.
This framework builds on the description of sovereignty provided by
Kathleen Claussen & Timothy Nichol who limit sovereignty to the role of organizing
international politics. See Kathleen Claussen & Timothy Nichol, Reconstructing
Sovereignty: The Impact of Norms, Practicesand Rhetoric, 10 BOLOGNA CENTRE J. INT'L
AFFS. 21, 23 (2007) ("Viewing sovereignty as an institutional arrangement for
organizing international politics helps scholars to conceive of ways in which
sovereignty is comprised of distinct and interrelated features.").
6.
See infra Part III.A (discussing the idea of "sovereignty in the people").
7.
See infra Part II.A (discussing the traditional notions of sovereignty and
challenges to them).
8.
There are a variety of efforts to recast sovereignty outside of the framework
of the nation-state. See, e.g., Oscar Schacter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its
Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 18 (1998)
(discussing sovereignty in failed states); Bruce Zagaris, Developments in the
InstitutionalArchitecture and Framework of International Criminal and Enforcement
Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AI. L. REV. 421, 514-15
(2006) (noting that global governance is adopting some of the state's previous roles);
Chad Flanders, Recent Publication, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 275 (2007) (reviewing J11RGEN
HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST (2006)); Veronica Yepez, Recent Publication, 32 YALE J.
INT'L L. 278 (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006)).
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state.9 Under the first rule of sovereignty, any actions or activities
that do not cross state borders fall within the state's exclusive
jurisdiction.' 0 External sovereignty, which is protected by the second
rule, prohibits the interference of one state in the matters of another
sovereign state when that interference threatens the territory or the
integrity of the second state." It "assert[s] that there is no final and
absolute authority above and beyond the sovereign state."12 External
sovereignty forbids cross-border attacks, considering it interference
with the integrity of that state.13
External sovereignty also serves as the basis for the third and
fourth rules of sovereignty. It demands a right to sovereign equality
between states, since no country can claim supremacy over or use its
power against another under international law.14 It also establishes
the rule that a state must consent to be bound by international legal
obligations, since no other body or government has authority to bind
it.15 These rules of international law pertaining to sovereignty are
viewed as the rights of sovereignty for purposes of this Article, as

they speak to protecting one state from the actions of another through
law.
Under international law, a political community is granted the
rights of sovereignty only once it achieves international recognition as
a state.16 It can achieve this recognition only if it meets the four
criteria for statehood. Statehood requires: (1) a territory with
definable borders, (2) a cohesive political community within the
territory,17 (3) political leadership that has control over the

David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty
9.
Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 162, 162 (David Held ed., 2d
ed. 2003).
See Sourgens, supra note 2, at 448 ("The current paradigm of sovereignty
10.
relies on the internal exclusive authority of the sovereign over its territory . . . .").
11.
See KURT MILLS, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER: A NEW
SOVEREIGNTY? 131 (1998) (discussing issues in determining the bounds of domestic
jurisdiction).
Held, supra note 9.
12.
See Philpott, supra note 4, at 20 ("If the state is private property, its
13.
external sovereignty is a no-trespassing law.").
See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern:A New Approach to an Outdated
14.
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003) (noting sovereignty's role in the idea of the
equality of nations).
15.
Held, supra note 9; Sourgens, supra note 2, at 448; see also Ivan Simonovid,
State Sovereignty and Globalization:Are Some States More Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 381, 384 (2000) (noting that sovereign states are members of an "exclusive
international club").
16.
DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 30-33
(2002).
17.
John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L.
907, 920-22 (2006).
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territory,' 8 and (4) leadership capable of conducting international
relations.19 Once a territory achieves statehood, it can only be lost in
the rarest of circumstances 20
As Part II.A describes, traditionally the government was
considered the sovereign that benefited from sovereign rights.
Challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty and to the identity of
the sovereign, however, make achievement of statehood an
insufficient criterion for determining when and to whom sovereign
rights vest. The remainder of Part II explains these challenges, and
provides the context for Part III's explanation of the meaning of
sovereignty in the people and for determining when a government
achieves sovereign authority and can claim sovereign rights.

A. Challenges to TraditionalNotions of Sovereignty
The traditional concept of sovereignty holds that the state is
sovereign. The rights of sovereignty belong to the state, acting
through its government, and are absolute.2 1 This concept derives from
the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 to end a thirty-year war that
devastated much of continental Europe.22 European rulers sought to
establish international peace by creating boundaries for state power
vis-A-vis another state. 23 The traditional concept contains no
requirement that the government be legitimate in the eyes of the

18.
See id. at 920 (describing a "form of governance that operates ... with some
measure of authenticity, effectiveness, and validation by the people" as requisite for
statehood); Jackson, supra note 14, at 786 (reciting a definition of sovereignty that
focuses on the existence of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given
territory). One important aspect of that control is that the government must hold a
monopoly over the use of force, meaning that the population within the territory
recognizes that the government is responsible for policing the territory and its borders.
Jackson, supra note 14, at 786.
19.
Matthew N. Bathon, The Atypical InternationalStatus of the Holy See, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 597, 618 (2001).
20.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 930-31 (discussing circumstances where a
territory may or may not lose legal "statehood").
21.
See Kelly, supranote 2, at 370 (discussing historical models of sovereignty).
22.
See, e.g., id. at 374 (noting the impact of the treaty of Westphalia on
international law). But see, Stephen Carley, Note, Limping Toward Elysium;
Impediments Created by the Myth of Westphalia on HumanitarianIntervention in the
InternationalLegal System, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2009) (suggesting that the
real source of the traditional concept of sovereignty is unclear).
23.
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 2, at 373-74 (describing the historical conditions
leading up to the Treaty of Westphalia and discussing how the Treaty made states
more independent and equal relative to each other). Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia,
sovereignty was in the ruler, most likely to be a king arguing a divine right to rule. Id.
at 374. The Treaty is considered "the point of marriage between sovereignty and state,
simultaneously birthing the modern system of states in international law." Id.
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people or conform to human rights standards. 24 Nor is the form of
government relevant to determining sovereignty.2 5 Whoever has the
power to control the population, territory, and borders has the right
to claim sovereignty and sovereign rights.
At least initially, the advent of the United Nations did little to
change this traditional concept of sovereignty. The United Nations
seeks to achieve an identical purpose to the Treaty of Westphalia-to
avoid war by organizing the international community. 26 Article 2 of
the UN Charter enshrines three of the rules of Westphalian
sovereignty:
The Organization and its Members ... shall act in accordance
with the following Principles.
1.
2.

3.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter ...

27

The United Nations also maintains a consent-based system of
international law as it requires members to accede to the
international treaties that form the backbone of international law. 28
However, the UN Charter does provide for one key limitation to
sovereignty. The remaining text of Article 2(7) permits international
intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state when there is "any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" that
threatens international peace and security.2 9 If a state defies the
rules of sovereignty, then it loses its sovereign rights.
Developments over the last half century, however, have led many
to challenge traditional notions of sovereignty, some going so far as to
proclaim them obsolete.30 These developments typically fall within

24.
Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 396, 399
(2005) (describing how, originally, sovereignty "only vaguely implied that the new
national government had any claim to legitimacy").
25.
Held, supra note 9, at 163.
26.
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
27.
Id. art. 2, paras. 1, 4, 7.
28.
See id. arts. 2, 4 (discussing UN membership and how members shall act in
accordance to their roles as members).
29.
Id. art. 2, para. 7.
30.
Sohail H. Hashmi, Introduction to STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CHANGE AND
PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 1 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 1997); see also

Sourgens, supra note 2, at 433-34 ("The idea of sovereignty is coming under increasing
attack from academic treatises and practical exigencies.").
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three categories: (1) global interdependence, (2) continuing strife, and
(3) human rights and humanitarian concerns. The globalinterdependence category captures challenges to traditional notions
of sovereignty related to the growth of international law and the
increasing influence of globalization on international relations.3 1 As
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes describe, "[M]odern
states are bound in a tightly woven fabric of international
agreements, organizations, and institutions that shape their relations
with each other and penetrate deeply into their internal economics
and politics."32 States increasingly have been ceding aspects of their
sovereignty to international organizations, such as the United
Nations and the World Trade Organization, and to regional bodies,
such as the African Union and the European Union.3 3 According to
the treaties establishing these bodies, member states commit
themselves to abide by rules established by the outside authority.3 4
These organizations essentially serve as a superior authority over
states in agreed-upon matters.
While membership in these international and regional
governmental bodies remains consent-based, the international
community of states also recognizes the existence of customary and
jus cogens norms of international law that restrain government
behavior regardless of express consent. 35 The concept of customary
international law developed before the creation of the United Nations,
dating back at least as far as 1847.36 Customary law is determined by
''a general and consistent practice of States followed by them out of a
37
It serves as a limit on state
sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris."
sovereignty, but arguably maintains the element of consent since it is
based on state practice.3 8

See ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
31.
27
(1995)
REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS
COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL
("[S]overeignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently . .. but
in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance
of international life.").
32.
Id. at 26.
33.
Cohan, supra note 17, at 909.
34.
U.N. Charter art. 2; Treaty on European Union art. A, July 29, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 191); Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4, July 11, 2000, available at
Marrakesh
http://www.africa-union.org/rootlaulaboutaulconstitutive-act-en.htm;
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
35.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S 331; see also MILLS, supra note 11, at 40 (defining jus cogens as "principles
from which there can be no derogation").
Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law
36.
Formation, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119, 129 (2007).
John R. Crook ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
37.
InternationalLaw, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 636, 639 (2007). Persistent objectors to customary law, however, are not bound by its rules
38.
unless they qualify as jus cogen norms. See Alex G. Peterson, Order Out of Chaos:
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The increasing interdependence of the international community
of states through international governmental organizations and
international law has led many to argue that sovereignty no longer
exists in its traditional sense:
[W]here the defining features of the international system are
connection rather than separation, interaction rather than isolation,
and institutions rather than free space, sovereignty as autonomy makes
no sense. The new sovereignty is status, membership, "connection to
39
the rest of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it."

The counterargument is simply that these international networks
and laws follow the existing rules of sovereignty by retaining the
requirement of consent, even if only implied. Until international
organizations, institutions, and laws are treated as a superior
authority to states regardless of consent, traditional notions of
sovereignty remain largely intact.
Globalization also strongly challenges traditional notions of
sovereignty in large part because states are finding it difficult to
control the flow of information, resources, and even problems across
their borders. Globalization has been "defined as the intensification of
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles
away and vice versa." 40 The internet, international companies, and
cheaper and more efficient travel and transport, among many other
factors, link different parts of the globe with each other. Proponents
believe globalization offers increased financial opportunities, cultural
exchanges, and often cheaper production of goods.41 Critics perceive
globalization as threatening as the increased social connections have
spread once-localized diseases; created international terrorist
networks; and, for some, permitted Western "cultural domination" of

Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 171 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8
(2002) (stating that states cannot avoid the binding effects ofjus cogen norms).
Cohan, supra note 17, at 939 (alteration in original) (quoting Anne-Marie
39.
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,40 STAN J. INT'L L. 283,
286 (2004)) (first level of internal quotation marks omitted).
40.
Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization as Hybridization, in MEDIA AND
CULTURAL STUDIES: KEYWORKS 658, 661 (Meenakshi Gigi Durham & Douglas M.
Kellner eds., rev. ed. 2006) (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITY 64 (1990)); see also Richard N. Haass, Remarks to the School of Foreign
Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University:
Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (defining globalization as "the sum
total of connections and interactions-political, economic, social, and cultural-that
compress distance and increase the permeability of traditional boundaries to the rapid
flow of goods, capital, people, ideas, and information").
41.
See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 17, at 910 (noting the impact of globalization on
state sovereignty); Haass, supra note 40 (discussing the threats that globalization
poses to sovereignty).
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local cultures.4 2 A positive or a negative depending on the
commentator, globalization has weakened traditional notions of
sovereignty: "[G]lobalization, with the concomitant *advance of
information technology and international commerce, is pushing
toward a borderless world, which makes it impossible for states to
operate unfettered powers of sovereignty."4 3
Globalization also makes it easier to justify intervention by one
state in the affairs of another as more and more seemingly domestic
actions have a global impact. Information about the internal affairs of
a state is broadcast globally and often immediately. International
outrage can serve as a check on governmental behavior locally.44 In
rare instances of particularly egregious human rights violations, now
publicized, the international community may even be required to act
to protect a population under the doctrine of responsibility to protect,
a point that will be picked up shortly.
In other instances, globalization unites diverse states behind
common causes. States are willing to concede some sovereignty to
address challenges and dangers that affect more than one country or
that shrink the boundaries between them. 45 For example, poor
environmental practices in a state that increase air and water
pollution are likely to affect neighboring states, making domestic
actions a matter of international concern. Activities once considered
sovereign can now be reviewed by neighboring countries as their
impact is no longer perceived as purely domestic. International
terrorism and crime have the same effect.
Continuing strife, largely internal, offers the next set of
challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty. The phenomena of
weak states, wars, and terrorism strongly affect a state's claim of
sovereignty. Weak states often lose control over some or all of its
population or territory, two elements necessary for claiming
statehood, although they retain their sovereign status. 46 As John
Alan Cohan explains:
A state may have sovereignty in the legal sense of having control over
its borders and of being recognized in international relations, but may
be unable to control its domestic affairs due to erosion of political
support from within, due to civil war, insurrection, secessionist
movements, or corruption. If things get bad enough, as where the
sovereign wages an unjust or illegal war, international respect for that

42.
Simonovi6, supranote 15, at 386.
43.
Cohan, supranote 17, at 910.
44.
See Jackson, supra note 14, at 789 ("[Tloday's globalized world abounds in
instances in which the actions of one nation . .. constrain and influence the internal
affairs of other nations.").
45.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 955 (addressing how globalization can
diminish state sovereignty).
46.
See id. at 909 (discussing common ways for states to lose control of their
sovereign powers).
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state's sovereignty could deteriorate, and other states may find it
necessary to intervene, either militarily or in less drastic ways, and
traditional
the
autonomy that characterizes
thereby usurp
47
sovereignty.

Globalization makes it impossible for continuing strife, even internal
strife, to remain hidden from the rest of the world and for other states
to turn a blind eye. Terrorism has a similar consequence because the
damage to human life or attacks that cross borders provide incentives
for other states to intervene. 48
The final category of challenges to traditional notions of
sovereignty-human rights and humanitarian concerns-is closely
linked to challenges caused by continuing strife. Increasingly, the
international community of states is recognizing the importance of
human rights and is refusing to simply watch as they are violated. 49
As Louis Henkin explains: "By state consent, by the growth of
systematic 'customary' (non-conventional) norms, international law
developed a comprehensive law of individual human rights holding
states responsible for . how they treated persons subject to their
jurisdiction."5 0 The international community now expects states to
live up to "universal" standards and norms, many of which are
"codified" in human rights treaties, or face the possibility of
intervention.5 1
Humanitarian intervention on behalf of populations suffering
from war, including civil war, has been on the increase since the early
1990s. 52 The United Nations, blocks of states, and even individual
states are intervening to protect populations vulnerable to
particularly egregious violations of human rights during a conflict.
Intervention often includes military action and efforts to change the

47.
Id.
48.
See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT 2.10 (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available
("The established and
at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%2OReport.pdf
universally acknowledged right to self-defense . . . was sometimes extended to include
the right to launch punitive raids into neighboring countries . . . ."); Helen Stacy,
Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2030 (2003) (noting that since the postWWII trials, international law has drawn a connection between human rights and
sovereignty).
49.
Stacy, supra note 48.
Kelly, supra note 2, at 381-82 (quoting Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
50.
LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 12 (1995)).
51.
See, e.g., Hashmi, supra note 30, at 3 ("There is today a growing consensus
that claims of state sovereignty should not be an impediment to international
intervention in the face of humanitarian crises."); Kelly, supra note 2, at 381-82
(discussing human rights and international intervention).
See, e.g., James Kurth, HumanitarianIntervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals
52.
vs. Military Realities, 1995 FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST. 88 (referring to the 1990s as "a
decade of humanitarian intervention"); Stacy, supra note 48 (noting humanitarian
interventions in Rwanda, Somalia, East Timor, and Kosovo).
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existing government.5 3 The shift favoring intervention over
sovereignty claims resulted in large part from atrocities and genocide
committed in the 1990s; 54 atrocities that spurred then-SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to ask, "If humanitarian
intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and
systematic violations of human rights . . .?"5
Canada responded to Annan's question by establishing the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) to reexamine sovereignty in light of human rights and
humanitarian concerns. 56 The ICISS developed the doctrine of
responsibility to protect, which was adopted unanimously by the
member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit.s7
Responsibility to protect places a duty on national governments to
protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and ethnic cleansing.58 Protection includes an obligation to
prevent these atrocities, stop them if they occur, and then rebuild the
affected society.5 9 If national governments fail in their duties, the
international community then has a responsibility to intervene on
behalf of the population. 60 The doctrine is particularly important in
that it does not simply permit intervention in those circumstances,
but requires it. It authoritatively alters traditional notions of
sovereignty, albeit through the consent of member states.
Development of notions of sovereignty to accommodate the human
rights and humanitarian challenges are particularly relevant to
determining the meaning of sovereignty in the people and is
discussed more fully below.
There is little question that the rights of sovereignty are
narrowing. Each of the challenges described above is changing the
contours of sovereign rights, making it more difficult for governments
to hide bad behavior behind a shield of sovereignty. As a former
Secretary-General of the United Nations explained, "The time of

53.
Cohan, supranote 17, at 954.
54.
ICISS REPORT, supranote 48, 1.1.
55.
U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in
the Twenty-First Century, 1 191, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).
56.
Forewardto ICISS REPORT, supra note 48, at vii-viii.
57.
G.A. Res. 60/1,
138-139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); see also
Irwin Cotler & Jared Genser, Op-Ed., Libya and the Responsibility To Protect, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/0liht-edcotler
01.html?_r=1& (recounting the unanimous vote in 2005).
2.29 (discussing a government's
58.
See ICISS REPORT, supra note 48,
"responsibility to protect"); Gareth Evans, The Limits of State Sovereignty: The
Responsibility To Protect in the 21st Century, Presentation, International Centre for
Ethnic Studies (2007).
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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absolute and exclusive sovereignty .. . has passed; its theory was
never matched by reality."61
For some, these changes suggest that the doctrine of sovereignty
is unnecessary, irrelevant, or obsolete. 62 These views ignore some of
the practical benefits of sovereignty, which include that sovereignty
rules and the rights they create retain order and stability within the
international community.63 Sovereignty also provides an outlet for
self-determination, particularly for populations that suffer under
foreign domination. 64 Most importantly, however, claims that
sovereignty is unnecessary, irrelevant, or obsolete overlook the fact
that pragmatically it remains the foundation of the international
legal system. 65
B. Reconceiving Sovereignty
Reflecting these numerous challenges to sovereignty and the
narrowing of the concept, new definitions of and nuances to
sovereignty have been proposed. The literature is rife with new ways
to describe sovereignty, attaching words that modify or limit
66
sovereignty to reflect apparent changes to the traditional doctrine.
Kathleen Claussen and Timothy Nichol provide a helpful framework
for understanding the new definitions or reconceptions of sovereignty.
They divide the modifying or limiting terms into three categories of
"qualifiers": (1) collectivity qualifiers, (2) divisibility qualifiers, and
67
(3) contingency qualifiers.
Collectivity qualifiers, such as "pooled" or "collective," cover new
conceptions of sovereignty based on the growing number of regional
and international governmental organizations to which states cede
aspects of their sovereignty.6 8 These qualifiers recognize that the

Jackson, supra note 14, at 787 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda
61.
for Peace-Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the
Secretary-General,1 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992)).
See, e.g., Claussen & Nichol, supra note 5 at 21-22 (summarizing various
62.
theories advanced to explain the perceived death of the doctrine of sovereignty).
2.7 (describing the ways in which
See ICISS REPORT, supra note 48,
63.
sovereignty orders international relations); Haass, supra note 40 ("Sovereignty ... has
fostered world order by establishing legal protections against external intervention and
by offering a diplomatic foundation for the negotiation of international treaties, the
formation of international organizations, and the development of international law.").
1.32 (explaining the impact of the idea
See ICISS REPORT, supra note 48,
64.
that sovereignty grants all nations equal rights).
See, e.g., Hashmi, supra note 30 (arguing that sovereignty has become the
65.
cornerstone of international relations).
See Claussen & Nichol, supra note 5 at 24-25 (analyzing various
66.
reinterpretations of the doctrine of sovereignty that have arisen in recent decades).
See Claussen & Nichol, supra note 5' at 26-28 (explaining the three
67.
categories of qualifiers).
See id. at 26 (explaining collective sovereignty).
68.
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state is not always supreme within the international community,
although the system of supranational organizations remains based on
consent. They respond to the challenges to sovereignty created by
global interdependence.
Divisibility qualifiers separate out the different functions of
sovereignty to permit allocation of parts of sovereignty to state or
nonstate actors that together create full sovereignty.6 9 These
qualifiers include: "disaggregated sovereignty, late sovereignty,
earned sovereignty, imperial sovereignty, pluralistic sovereignty,
constrained sovereignty, phased sovereignty, limited sovereignty and
partial sovereignty."70 They serve a similar function to collectivity
qualifiers. Both highlight that the state rarely retains full sovereignty
in the traditional sense; rather, aspects of sovereignty devolve to
others through consent 1 or, at times, by force. 72 These qualifiers
reflect challenges to sovereignty from global interdependence,
continuing strife, and human rights and humanitarian concerns.
The last category, contingency qualifiers, reflects the belief that
states must meet certain conditions before they can claim
sovereignty, in addition to the four requirements for statehood
described above. 3 Examples of contingency qualifiers include
contingent sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and relational
sovereignty. The types of conditions placed on sovereignty vary by
theorist and range from requiring a democratic form of government to
abiding by UN human rights obligations.7 4 At a minimum, they
require states to meet certain human rights and humanitarian law
requirements or be stripped of sovereign rights.75
Missing from the Claussen and Nichols categories are qualifiers
that reflect a change in understanding over the identity of the
sovereign. Historically, sovereignty rested with a religious or clan

69.
See id. (explaining divisibility of sovereignty).
70.
Id.
71.
For example, a state may cede part of its sovereignty to an international or
regional organization.
72.
See Claussen & Nichol, supra note 5, at 27 (describing "earned sovereignty"
and how sovereignty can devolve during times of conflict).
73.
See id. at 27-28 (describing how the criteria states must meet to retain
their sovereign status have multiplied recently).
74.
See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 24, at 396 (discussing a commission report
recommending that sovereign rights be made contingent upon multiple factors,
including respect for human rights); Symposium, Commentary by Experts, 4 NW. U. J.
INT'L HuM. RTS. 39, 41-42 (2005) (discussing the development of the idea of contingent
sovereignty in international dialogue).
See Claussen & Nichol, supra note 5 at 27-28 (explaining the role of
75.
humanitarian principles in the composition of the basic prerequisites to contingent
sovereignty).
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leader or a monarchical figure,7 6 whereas now there is an expectation
that the people constitute the true sovereigns.77 In the past, the
leader or ruler was the source of law and therefore above it,7 8
whereas currently the people act as the source of law, which limits
the government. Identity qualifier terms such as "popular
sovereignty" and "democratic sovereignty" exemplify this change,
reflecting the belief that the state represents the people rather than
serves as the sovereign.7 9 These qualifiers indicate the shift in focus
in international law from solely protecting the interests of states to
recognition of the importance of human rights regardless of state
boundaries.8 0
While the thesis of this Article does not rely on attaching
particular words to the term sovereignty to limit or modify its
meaning, two of the categories described above play an important role
in understanding the meaning of sovereignty in the people. As the
next Part examines in depth, the principles underlying identity and
contingency qualifiers are closely linked and together explain why
governments cannot simply employ sovereignty to avoid intervention
into their domestic behavior.

See Kelly, supra note 2, at 364 (explaining that the concept of sovereignty
76.
has not always been tied to the state); Simonovi6, supra note 15 (noting that at one
time, monarchs possessed what would later be called state sovereignty).
See Simonovid, supra note 15 (noting some of the questions raised by the
77.
idea that the people of a nation are sovereign).
78.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 908-09 (reviewing the traditional conception
of sovereignty).
79.
Popular sovereignty does not require a particular form of government to
serve as a representative of the people. See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 11, at 42 (arguing
that the people of a state are the ultimate source of that state's sovereign authority,
regardless of the state's form of government). Democratic sovereignty presumes that
"the state itself. . . [is] the democratic expression of the political community." Kenneth
Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance
Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2005) (reviewing
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER (2004)).

This becomes apparent in international law through concepts such as
80.
universal jurisdiction and responsibility to protect. Universal jurisdiction allows any
state to prosecute a political leader who has committed crimes against humanity, war
crimes, or both against his or her constituency. Universal jurisdiction does not require
a jurisdictional connection to the prosecuting country and has no regard for the
sovereignty of the state or any sovereign rights that accrue to the political leadership.
Responsibility to protect also effectively lands on the side of the people as the sovereign
as it ignores any claim to sovereignty by a government committing mass atrocities. If
the political leadership were the true sovereign, such intervention would be a violation
of sovereignty and illegal under international law.

2013/

RETURNING SOVEREIGNTY TO THE PEOPLE

113

III. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PEOPLE
Governments that use sovereignty to hide from criticism and to
prevent international intervention 1 to stop human rights abuses
wrongly assume that they are the sovereigns entitled to the rights of
sovereignty and that these rights are absolute. Relying on the
justifications for contingency and identity qualifiers, Part III
challenges this assumption by giving content to the concept of
sovereignty in the people. Part III.A identifies the people as the
sovereign and the government as their representative. Under this
formulation, the government's access to sovereign rights is not
inherent, but instead is contingent on it fulfilling its duties as
representative of the sovereign. Part III.B describes the duties that a
government must fulfill before it can claim sovereign rights on behalf
of the people. Part III.C then tackles what happens when
governments fail to respect the identity of the sovereign and meet
those conditions. Who determines whether a government is meeting
its duties is addressed in Part III.D. Part III.E concludes with a
description of how the lead-up to international support for the
rebellion in Libya during the Arab Spring lends nascent support to
the concept of sovereignty in the people proposed here.
A. Identifying the Sovereign
The phrase sovereignty in the people captures the true identity of
the sovereign vested with the rights of sovereignty. While
traditionally the international community treated the state (or the
government acting on its behalf) as the sovereign, domestic and
international law supports the shift of sovereignty to the people.
From the most liberal democracies to the most autocratic states, most
constitutions proclaim that the people are sovereign.8 2 The concept

As explained in Part III.C, intervention refers to any measure used to
81.
encourage or coerce a government to change its policies. Intervention covers
nonmilitary measures such as censure, conditions on aid, trade and diplomatic
relations, and political and economic sanctions. It also covers military intervention as
well as those that violate territorial integrity, including dropping unwanted food and
other supplies in devastated areas, providing funding and other support to opposition
or armed groups, and also conducting military activities within the territory of another
state.
See, e.g., QANUN-I ISAsl-I AFGHANISTAN art. 4 (noting that Afghanistan's
82.
sovereignty "belong[s] to the nation," which is defined as all Afghan citizens);
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE art. 6
(1996) (vesting sovereignty solely with the people); BANGLADESH SHONGBIDHAN art. 7
(vesting all national power in the hands of the people); KANSTiTUTSilX RESPUBLIKI
BELARUS' art. 3 (designating the people as the "respository of sovereignty");
CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 1 (Braz.) (designating the people as the source of all
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often appears in the titles of states, such as "The People's Republic
of," or in provisions expressly stating that sovereignty lies in the
people.
Sovereignty in the people also likely forms part of customary
international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) states in Article 21(3) that: "The will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government."83 As a declaration, the
UDHR is nonbinding; however, many academics and practitioners
believe that its provisions constitute customary international law. 84
To the extent this assertion is true, all governments then must abide
by sovereignty in the people regardless of whether their domestic law
or constitutions expressly adopt the concept.
Sovereignty in the people also receives support as a principle of
customary international law to the extent sovereignty is treated as
synonymous with self-determination, 85 which is an accepted principle
of customary international law. 86 At its most basic, self-determination
means the right to govern oneself;8 7 sovereignty in the people then
national power); XLANFA pmbl., arts. 1-2, (1982) (China) (designating China a
sovereign state with all power stemming from the people); 1958 CONST. art. 3 (Fr.)
(designating the people as a whole the sole and exclusive sovereigns of France);
UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA 1945 art. 1 (declaring the people
sovereign); LIBYA CONST. (1969) art. 1 (declaring that sovereignty rests with the
people); CONSTITUTION DE LA RPPUBLIQUE DU MALI pmbl., art. 25 (declaring Mali a
sovereign state governed by and for its people); Constituci6n Politica de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos [C.P], art. 39, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de
1917 (declaring the people the source of national sovereignty); KONSTITUTSIIA
ROSSIISKOi FEDERATSII [KoNST. RF] art. 3 (Russ.) (declaring the people sovereign);
CONSTITUci6N DE LA REPCIBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 5 (declaring the
people the ultimate sovereigns).
83.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21(3),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
84.
See MILLS, supra note 11, at 39 (explaining that the UDHR is typically
viewed as an embodiment of customary international law despite the fact that it is
officially nonbinding). But see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287,
348 (1995) ("Despite the arguments of some that a 'right to democracy' may be
emerging as a norm of international customary law, it is apparent that many states
have not accepted article 21's guarantee of the right to participate in the political life of
one's country." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
85.
See JOHN HOFFMAN, SOVEREIGNTY 97 (1998) (discussing the role of
sovereignty in international law and its link to self-determination); Srinivas
Aravamudan, Sovereignty: Between Embodiment and Detranscendentalization,41 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 427, 430 (2006) (discussing the historical interplay between selfdetermination and sovereignty); Kelly, supra note 2, at 390 (discussing the relationship
between sovereignty and self-determination).
86.
See Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh
Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 62 (2008) (discussing the development of the
principle of self-determination in international law).
87.
See Joy M. Purcell, A Right To Leave, but Nowhere To Go: Reconciling an
Emigrant's Right To Leave with the Sovereign's Right To Exclude, 39 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 177, 182 (2007) (discussing the origin and definition of the right to selfdetermination).
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would grant the people the right to govern themselves. More broadly,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
define self-determination as the right of peoples to "freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development."88
If the people are sovereign, then the benefits of sovereignty
belong to them. The people then can choose how to exercise that
sovereignty. In practice, they transfer their rights as sovereign to
representatives that serve as the government.89 The government then
conducts the state's domestic and international affairs and receives
the benefits of sovereignty as the people's representative.9 o
Governments, however, do not inherently deserve the rights and
protections of sovereignty; rather, they receive them only if the people
choose to grant them. Governments then must act based on the will
and common good of their constituencies. Any government that
controls the state against the wishes of the people does not receive
sovereign authority. It may have the power to enforce its will against
the people, but the illegitimate government is not entitled to
sovereign rights.
The theoretical underpinnings of this understanding of
sovereignty in the people derive from centuries-old thinkers such as
John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Locke theorized about
sovereignty in the people, or popular sovereignty, in his Second
Treatise of Civil Government (1690).91 He started by describing the

88.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI)
A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI)
A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). These provisions typically spark
the debate over who constitutes a "people." There seems to be at least a general
assumption that the individuals that form a majority of a particular political
community within a state are a "people" deserving of self-determination. The debate,
thus, usually centers on which minority communities are entitled to a degree of
political autonomy from the majority group.
89.
This stands in direct contrast to the notion of the state as the sovereign or
of the government as the representative of the state.
90.
W. Michael Reisman describes this mechanism:
Political legitimacy henceforth was to derive from popular support;
governmental authority was based on the consent of the people in the territory
in which a government purported to exercise power. At first only for those
states in the vanguard of modern politics, later for more and more states, the
sovereignty of the sovereign became the sovereignty of the people: popular
sovereignty.
W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
91.
See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
(Thomas Hollis ed., 1764) (describing the proper origins and boundaries of civil
government).
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formation of a political community to counter the violence that can
occur when individuals pursue their interests without regard for
others and without a superior body to protect them.9 2 To protect
against that chaos, individuals consent to a social contract in which
they agree to follow the laws of a government that will act based on
the common good of the community.9 3 Individuals agree to turn over
their natural rights as individuals to a government to better protect
their interests. The majority of the political community determines
the common good the government protects. 94
Locke expected the government, now holding sovereign
authority, to regulate relationships between individuals and protect
their rights to life, liberty, and property.95 He described these as
natural rights that transcend claims of sovereignty. 96 The
government is not permitted to deprive individuals of any of these
rights;97 if it does, the people have a right to revolt against the
government or to secede from the territory under its control.98
Through the social contract, the people give the government the
authority to act for their common good; if the government uses its
authority to violate natural rights, the authority is revoked.9 9
Rousseau developed the concept of sovereignty in the people
along similar lines.1 00 Like Locke, Rousseau believed that individuals
reach a social contract for their self-preservation.1 01 They place their
natural rights in government hands to protect their interests and the
common good; these rights are returned to the people if the
government violates the social contract.102 Rousseau believed that

92.
See id. § 6 (describing the transition from the state of nature to a more
ordered civilization).
93.
See id. § 96 (describing the operation of a voluntarily formed community).
94.
See id. § 95 (describing the voluntary formation of a community and the
decision-making rules of such a community).
95.
See Stacy, supra note 48, at 2034 (discussing Locke's view of sovereignty).
According to Locke, the government is bound by the trust of the people and "the law of
God and nature." See LOCKE, supra note 91, § 142 (discussing the restraints on
government).
96.
See LOCKE, supra note 91, § 135 (describing unalterable limits on
governmental power).
97.
See id. § 139 (describing absolute limitations on government power).
98.
See Stacy, supra note 48, at 2034 (describing the methods citizens may
permissibly use to restrain an overreaching government).
99.
See LOCKE, supra note 91, § 149 (describing circumstances in which people
can revoke their government's power).
100.
See Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Constitutionaland InternationalLaw, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 328 (1991) (noting
Rousseau's thoughts on sovereignty).
See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. 1, ch. 6 (G.D.H.
101.
Cole trans., 1762), available at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (describing
the nature and formation of the social contract).
102.
See id. (describing the nature, formation, and dissolution of the social
contract).
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individuals must relinquish some of their natural liberty, which is
determined by their individual strength to pursue their own
interests, when forming a political community.10 3 However, he
considered the rights individuals receive in return, including the
04
right to justice, to be greater than those surrendered.1 The will of
the people as a collective determines these greater rights, which are
intended to be shared equally. 0 5 According to Rousseau, when the
government uses its strength to override the will of the people, it
becomes the master, not the sovereign.106
Under Rousseau's theory, the people vest their sovereign
authority in a legislature that is chosen by the people.' 0 7 As the
people's representative, the legislature has the absolute authority of
the traditional concept of sovereignty. 0 8 Rousseau did not foresee
any potential conflict of interest between the people and the
legislature:
The sovereign legislature thus was identified by Rousseau with the
general will of the people. As such, the legislature could never enact a
law which it could not break, and since the subordinates of state
authority are also constituent parts of the volont6 gdnrale [general
will], those subjects and the general will can never have conflicting
109
interests.

Both theorists saw the social contract as a mechanism for
organizing the domestic affairs of the political community-an
agreement between individuals to establish a government that must
abide by the will of the majority and act on the basis of the common

See id. ch. 8 (discussing what an individual gains and sacrifices in the
103.
process of forming a community),
See id. (describing the nature of the net gain men realize by forming
104.
communities).
105.
See id. (describing the nature and limitations of the gains realized by
forming communities).
106.
See id. bk. 2, ch. 1 (discussing the consequences of a government
overstepping its authority).
107.
See van der Vyver, supra note 100, at 329 (describing the formation and
nature of the state's legislative authority).
108.
See ROUSSEAU, supra note 101, bk. 1, ch. 7 (describing the nature and
limits of the state's authority).
van der Vyver, supra note 100, at 330 (footnotes omitted). Rousseau had
109.
stated:
These clauses, properly understood,
alienation of each associate, together
community; for, in the first place, as
conditions are the same for all; and, this
making them burdensome to others.
ROUSSEAU, supra note 101.

may be reduced to one-the total
with all his rights, to the whole
each gives himself absolutely, the
being so, no one has any interest in
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good of that community.110 Individuals relinquish their rights to the
government for their protection and the government receives
sovereign authority. Individuals, however, always retain the power to
revoke the social contract when the government violates those rights.
As with traditional rules of international relations in which states
must consent to limit their sovereignty, domestic relations depend on
the consent of the sovereign individuals to limit their sovereignty.
The works of Locke and Rousseau greatly influenced the French and
American revolutions and are credited with establishing the basis for
democracy and human rights."' These two philosophers and the
movements that followed them began to shift the title of sovereign to
the people." 2
Relying on Locke and Rousseau's concept of a social contract and
supported by constitutional and international legal guarantees of
sovereignty in the people, governments do not have the power to act
independently of their people. They serve as the representatives of
the people, not the state, which is merely a territorial unit in which a
political community lives. As representatives of the people, the
government is tasked with protecting the political community from
domestic and international threats to its security and the common
good.113 As Part III.A describes, a government can claim sovereign
rights only when it achieves its purpose. As Part III.B explores,
dependent on the people for its authority, a government no longer can
simply invoke the rights of sovereignty against international criticism
and action when abusing human rights.

As will be described in Part IV, majority rule can be highly problematic and
110.
is no longer considered acceptable as notions of human rights and self-determination
have evolved since the times of Locke and Rousseau.
111.
See Cindy G. Buys, Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the
Ostrich Response to the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional
Interpretation,21 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 18 (2007) (describing the influence of Locke's ideas
on the American Revolution and noting the modern implications); Jean d'Aspremont,
Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 877,
883-84 (2006) (describing the pervasiveness of the notion of popular sovereignty and
linking it to the concept of human rights); Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary,
Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis of the Common Law Governing PostEmployment Non-Compete Contracts for Media Employees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1073, 1114-15, 1117 (2007) (discussing the influence of Locke's ideas on the
modern conception of democracy); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1332-33 (2001)
(discussing some of the details of Rousseau's democracy).
See Buys, supra note 111 (discussing the impact of Locke's thinking on the
112.
idea of sovereignty); d'Aspremont, supra note 111 (discussing the impact of Locke and
Rousseau on governmental legitimacy).
See MILLS, supra note 11, at 27, 37 (arguing that states exist for the
113.
security and protection of their citizens). This line of thinking also derives from the
work of Thomas Hobbes. See Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International
Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1687 (1995) (discussing the role of the state in the
writings of Hobbes).
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B. Retaining Sovereign Rights
When the people grant sovereign authority to a government, the
authority the government receives depends on its efforts to achieve
the security and common good of the people.114 To retain its authority
to represent the people and therefore claim sovereign rights, the
government must meet two requirements: (1) it must hold domestic
legitimacy;1 5 and (2) it must fulfill duties necessary for abiding by
the will of the people and acting in accordance with the common
good.116 The first condition, described more fully in Part III.B.1,
ensures that the people have authorized the government as the
sovereign representative. The power of the government to gain
control over a population must not be confused with the consent of
the people to relinquish their sovereign power to the government.
The second condition, described more fully in Part III.B.2, serves
multiple purposes. According to the ICISS, recognizing government
responsibility to the people has three important impacts:
First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the
functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of
their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political
authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the
international community.. . . And thirdly, it means that the agents of
state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are
1 17
accountable for their acts of commission and omission.

Conditioning entitlement to sovereign rights on the fulfillment of
duties to the people ensures governmental accountability to the
sovereign people.
If a government fails to achieve either or both of these conditions
of sovereignty, then it loses some or all of its right to claim sovereign
authority and the rights of sovereignty. When a government claims
sovereignty to shield its behavior, the international community first
must ask on whose behalf that claim is made. International
intervention on behalf of the people ultimately bolsters sovereignty
since the people constitute the true sovereigns."t 8 Refusal to
intervene, to the advantage of the government and disadvantage of

114.
See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 11, at 38 (discussing the idea that people create
government to foster their chosen way of life and thus have the ability to dismantle
their government if it steps outside the bounds they have set for it, or if it otherwise
fails to carry out its duties).
115.
See d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 878 (discussing the importance of
domestic governmental legitimacy to international affairs).
116.
See Sourgens, supra note 2, at 467 (discussing the implications of
conditioning sovereignty on respect for human rights).

117.

ICISS REPORT, supra note 48,

2.15.

118.
See MATTHEW S. WEINERT, DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY AUTHORITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND STATE IN A GLOBALIZING AGE 73 (2007) (discussing the relationship
between international intervention and sovereignty).
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the people, undermines sovereignty by allowing the power of the
government to override the will and common good of the true
sovereign.
1.

Legitimacy

Two different types of legitimacy inform the determination of a
government's entitlement to claim sovereign rights-internal and
external. Internal legitimacy concerns whether a government receives
domestic support, as the people's representative, for its actions.1 19
External legitimacy describes whether the international community
of states recognizes a government as legitimate, which in turn
determines whether it will respect the government's sovereignty. 120
Sovereignty in the people, as argued here, demands that a
government maintain internal legitimacy in order to claim sovereign
authority. If the government fails to achieve internal legitimacy, the
international community should deny external legitimacy and refuse
sovereign rights to that government. 12 1
The concept of internal legitimacy flows from sovereignty in the
people. Since the American and French revolutions, when sovereignty
in the people was institutionalized, the legitimacy of a government
122
has depended on whether the people have supported it.
Determining legitimacy in practice proves far more complicated, as
there is no accepted formula for measuring popular support. As Jean
d'Aspremont describes:
The highly controversial character of governments' legitimacy stems
from the subjectivity of its evaluation. Indeed, there are no objective
criteria to determine governments' legitimacy. That means that each
state enjoys a comfortable leeway when asked to recognize the power of
an entity that claims to be another state's representative in their
bilateral intercourse. Each state evaluates foreign governments'
123
legitimacy through the criteria that it chooses.

See d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 882-83 (discussing and explaining
119.
internal and external legitimacy of governments).
See id. (explaining external legitimacy and its relationship with internal
120.
legitimacy).
Unfortunately, external legitimacy is rarely decided on the basis of a state's
121.
behavior towards its citizenry. Instead, in most cases, once a country attains statehood,
it achieves external legitimacy and the full benefits of sovereignty automatically. See
id. (describing how external legitimacy depends on whether a state meets the four
elements necessary for statehood.); Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self
Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 275
(1992) (discussing the actual interplay between internal and external legitimacy in the
real world).
See Reisman, supra note 90 (discussing the development of the idea of
122.
popular sovereignty and its institutionalization in international law).
d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 878-79 (emphasis omitted) (footnote
123.
omitted).
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The international community seems to rely most heavily on a
test of periodic, free and fair elections to determine a government's
legitimacy. 124 The UDHR and the ICCPR treat those elections as a
universal right. 2 5 For many scholars, only democratic governments
can achieve legitimacy and therefore benefit from sovereign rights. 26
Testing legitimacy by whether a government is elected raises the
issue of what democracy consists of. Does democracy require nothing
more than free and fair elections to change a government, which is
procedural democracy?1 27 For some, the answer is yes. As one
commentator proclaimed: "[I]n circumstances in which free elections
are internationally supervised and the results are internationally
endorsed as free and fair and the people's choice is clear, the world
community does not need to speculate on what constitutes popular
sovereignty in that country." 2 8 Others argue that democracy requires
more. It also requires democracy in the exercise of government

See Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and
124.
the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 23, 42 (2004) (quoting UDHR, supra note 83) (discussing the role free elections
play in governmental legitimacy and sovereignty); Rachel Ricker, Two (or Five, or Ten)
Heads Are Better than One: The Need for an Integrated Effort to InternationalElection
Monitoring, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1373, 1400 (2006) (discussing the importance of
impartial elections to governmental legitimacy); Angela R. Riley, Good (Native)
Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1099 & n.349 (2007) (characterizing a "good
govern[ment]" as democratic, with free and fair elections). According to the EU
Handbook for European Union Election Observation, free and fair elections require
regular elections in which there is: equal opportunity to run for office and to vote
without discrimination; a secret ballot; freedom of expression, association, and
assembly to allow all parties to air their platform; equal access for candidates and
parties to state resources; and an independent and accountable election
administration. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
ELECTION OBSERVATION 14-15 (2d ed. 2008).

HANDBOOK

FOR EUROPEAN

UNION

See d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 893 (discussing the idea that
125.
democracy depends on elections, and citing the UDHR and ICCPR). See generally
Martin Nettesheim, Developing a Theory of Democracy for the European Union, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 358, 368-69 (2005) (discussing various conceptions of democracy).
Article 21(3) of the UDHR requires periodic, free elections to ensure that the people
authorize the government. See UDHR, supra note 83 (mandating elections and
detailing characteristics those elections must possess). ICCPR Article 25 guarantees a
right of all people to participate in free, fair, and universal elections of their
governments. See ICCPR, supranote 88, art. 25 (requiring use of impartial elections).
See e.g., d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 884-85 ("[T]he idea that
126.
democracy is the only acceptable type of regime has gained broad support, even
monopolizing the political discourse (despite a lingering disagreement about its
accurate meaning). This evolution has been underpinned by the common belief that
democracy bolsters peace and prosperity, and even quells terrorism." (footnotes
omitted)).
There is a substantive requirement for a free and fair election, but the
127.
point being made here is whether free and fair elections alone should determine a
government's legitimacy. See supra note 124 (discussing the requirements that attach
to legitimate elections).
128.
Reisman, supra note 90, at 871; see also d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at
891 (discussing the focus on procedure in evaluations of democratic processes).
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functions. This type of democracy, known as substantive democracy,
demands a basic respect for human rights and equality, as well as
tolerance in political decision making once the elections are
complete.1 29 Representative governments must make their decisions
democratically, formulating the common good to include the interests
of all members of the political community, rather than permitting the
majority alone to make those decisions.13 0 Substantive democracy
ensures both that the government is chosen based on the will of the
people, the procedural aspect, and that it acts in accordance with the
will and common good of all the people, the substantive aspect.' 3 '
This Article adopts substantive democracy as the appropriate
litmus test for determining legitimacy as it most broadly reflects the
meaning of sovereignty in the people. Free and fair elections, alone,
are not enough to ensure that the government will act according to
the people's will or their vision of the common good. A far wider range
of human rights must be protected to achieve these goals, which is
accounted for in the concept of substantive democracy. Part III.B.2
describes the rights that must be protected and enforced to fulfill
substantive democracy and therefore achieve domestic legitimacy. It
also discusses additional duties that go beyond those required for
representative governmental decision making, which are necessary
for ensuring sovereignty in the people.
2.

Sovereign Duties

Meeting the criteria for legitimacy is not enough for a
government to claim sovereign rights. A government may claim them
only once it has met its responsibilities to the people. These duties are
not merely domestic but also create international responsibilities,
since international recognition of sovereign rights of a government
should depend on them.132 As Cohan describes, "In the era of
international human rights, it seems the international community

See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a
129.
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 39 (2002) (discussing the
requirements of substantive democracy); d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 881-82
(discussing the importance of the legitimacy of exercise of government functions).
130.
See Gidon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question that
the Legislature Seeks To Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who Is a Jew as an
Illustration, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1233, 1280 (2006) (discussing different
definitions of democracy and their impact on the powers of the majority and the
condition of the people as a whole).
131.
See, e.g., Barak, supra note 129 (arguing that a formal constitution is
required to maintain a real democracy); d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 881-82
(distinguishing between the legitimacy of origin and the legitimacy of exercise).
132.
Sourgens, supra note 2, at 468; Haass, supra note 40.
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has become a party to the social contract between citizens and their
government."13 3
The duties required of governments to retain sovereign authority
overlap with the substantive requirements for democracy and
legitimacy,134 but potentially also include wider responsibilities to the
people. 35 Even if they are identical, it remains important to
distinguish the requirements of legitimacy from sovereign duties. It
ensures that the international community will look beyond free and
fair elections to determine whether the government is protecting the
people's will and common good beyond the electoral process. Without
separate requirements, illiberal democracies in which governments
are elected but do not adopt democratic decision making could
inappropriately benefit from sovereign rights as the elected
representatives of the people.
The next question is how to determine what duties should be
required for governments to claim sovereign rights. At a minimum,
governments have a duty to protect the human rights of their
citizens: "[S]ince the social purpose of the state is to enable its
citizens to live, then it makes sense to recognize that social purpose
as a right for each person. The state may hold these rights in trust,
but cannot violate these rights for raison d'etat."I3 6 Proponents of
conditional sovereignty consistently require governments to adhere to
basic or fundamental human rights, but they rarely define those
rights.' 3 7 This is likely because the determination of basic or
fundamental rights is subjective and controversial. Many academics
and practitioners argue that human rights are interdependent and
indivisible, making it impossible to establish a hierarchy of rights.i38
Others fear that a hierarchy of rights will preference rights based on

133.
Cohan, supra note 17, at 943.
134.
Legitimacy and sovereign duties both include democratic rights. For
example, both require governments to guarantee equality and free and fair elections.
135.
For example, states may use torture against suspected domestic terrorists
with the support of the population terrified of terrorist crimes. The government
utilizing torture could be wholly legitimate in the eyes of its population if it fulfills its
democratic responsibilities and the targets of torture are not determined by
discrimination. The act of torture is illegal in all circumstances under customary
international law regardless of whether the general population supports it. The use of
torture, thus, would violate the government's sovereign duties even as it retains its
legitimacy.
136.
K. Mills, Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The Legitimacy of HumanitarianAccess
and Intervention, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (July 4, 1997), http://sites.tufts.edul
jha/archives/111.
1.35 (noting that the internal
See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 48,
137.
responsibility of sovereignty is "to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people
within the state").
Teraya Koji, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and
138.
Beyond: From the Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 917, 918
(2001).
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particular, rather than universal, political experiences or favor a
dominant political culture. 3 9
While ideally the duties of the sovereign include protecting and
promoting all human rights, it is unrealistic and not necessarily
appropriate to deny sovereign rights when not all human rights are
met. No government is likely to achieve the ideal, and it seems unfair
to refuse sovereign rights to governments substantially following the
will and fulfilling the common good of the people. That conclusion
leads back to the dilemma of essentially determining a hierarchy of
rights. Establishing objective criteria for ascertaining fundamental
rights and corresponding duties is extremely difficult. This Article
offers some guidance as to which rights a government must enforce to
benefit from sovereign rights; they derive from the meaning of
sovereignty in the people and from the rights the international
community has already recognized as fundamental. The rights listed
here, however, are not fully inclusive of those that create sovereign
duties; instead, they provide a preliminary basis for determining
them.
At a minimum, legitimacy requires access to democratic rights.
From a procedural perspective, in addition to the right to vote in
periodic, free and fair elections, the people must be given rights that
allow them to make informed decisions when choosing their
representatives, including freedom of association, expression, and
press. Substantive democracy further requires governments to ensure
representative decision making, once elected, to accomplish true selfdetermination; thus the right to equality must be viewed as a core
democratic right. 140 Where there are minority groups historically
disadvantaged within the state, equality may demand minority
protections or affirmative action measures to ensure that all of the
population has an equal opportunity to participate in the
determination of the government and its policies.141 Legitimacy also
turns on the government's accountability to the people, which
establishes a right to accountability.
International law provides further guidance in the decision over
which rights must be met by the government in order for it to fulfill
its sovereign duties. Customary international law, nonderogable
rights, jus cogens, responsibility to protect, and international criminal
law offer a partial list of the fundamental rights. These sources of law

This subpart addresses these concerns shortly.
139.
Nettesheim, supra note 125, at 373.
140.
The concept of sovereignty in the people theorized by Locke and Rousseau
141.
accepted majority rule, seemingly never anticipating the risk of tyranny of the
majority. Many years of experience show that majority rule can easily turn into
majority domination and lead to internal strife, necessitating the development of
sovereignty in the people to include minority rights. This is consistent with protecting
the political community from disorganization and internal strife.
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reflect the consensus of the international community as to which
rights must be guaranteed in practice regardless of consent and can
already be enforced by the international community regardless of
sovereignty claims. However, they cannot serve as the only sources,
as the international law system currently protects the power of
governments to determine what they are willing to abide by, which
undermines the concept of sovereignty in the people.
Determining which human rights have achieved customary
international law status is no less daunting of a task than
determining which rights are fundamental or basic. Customary
international law derives "from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."1 42
Determining consistent and general state practice is complex since all
countries violate human rights (although the extent of violations
varies) while promising to abide by them.14 3 Hurst Hannum
published a fairly comprehensive examination of the scope of
acceptance of the UDHR as customary international law in the mid1990s. According to his research, equality rights, including equal
treatment under the law and nondiscrimination protected in Articles
1, 2, 6 and 7, have achieved customary law status. 144 Article 3's
protection of the right to life constitutes customary law, as does the
and
enforced
against
extrajudicial
murder
prohibition
disappearances.1 45 The prohibitions on slavery and on cruel,
degrading, and inhuman treatment and punishment in Articles 4 and
5 have achieved customary law status.146 Rules regarding the
treatment of the criminally accused, particularly the right to be free
from torture, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention,
and the right to a fair trial (protected in Articles 9, 10 and 11,
respectively) also qualify as customary law. This list is not
necessarily comprehensive, but rather establishes a minimum of
which rights in the UDHR have achieved customary law status as of
when Hannum conducted his research. There may be other rights
that over the last seventeen years have achieved the status of
customary international law, not to mention rights listed in other
international declarations, treaties, and conventions.
Nonderogable rights provide another source of human rights that
governments may have a duty to protect in order to receive the

142.

§ 102(2)

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).

See Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of
143.
Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 151 (1995) (arguing that a
state is bound by a community-supported human right even if it disagrees with that
right and violates it).
144.
Hannum, supra note 84, at 342.
145.
Id. at 343.
146.
Id. at 344.
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benefit of sovereign rights. These rights cannot be abrogated for any
reason, including during a state of emergency, war, or any threat to
the state. 147 The fact that an existential threat to the state does not
permit violations of these rights indicates their fundamental
nature. 14 8 There are two sources of nonderogable rights: customary
international law and treaty law. Within customary international
law, jus cogens norms are considered binding and nonderogable.14 9
These rights have special status as a higher type of law; their
violation is considered impermissible in all cases. Prohibitions on
slavery, torture, and genocide fall within this category. 150 Violations
of jus cogens norms create obligations erga omnes that require the
international community of states to take action to prevent or stop
their violation.15 1 This obligation comports with the concept of
sovereignty in the people espoused in this Article.
Within treaty law, Article 4 of the ICCPR declares the following
rights nonderogable: (1) the right to life; (2) the prohibition of
genocide; (3) the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment and punishment; (4) the prohibition of slavery;
(5) the prohibition on imprisonment for failing to meet a contractual
obligation; (6) the prohibition of punishment for an act that was not a
crime at the time of its commission; (7) the right of every person to be
recognized as a person before the law; and (8) the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.1 5 2 Many of these rights already
have been listed as customary international law, a few rising to the
level of jus cogens norms.
The doctrine of responsibility to protect, which was adopted
unanimously by the UN General Assembly, provides another source
of duties a government owes its constituency in order to benefit from
sovereign rights. The doctrine establishes that each state has a duty
to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic
cleansing; if any state fails to fulfill this duty, it becomes the
responsibility of the international community.' 5 3 The crimes that
arise from violation of this duty are defined primarily in the four

Koji, supra note 138, at 924.
147.
148.
Id.
MILLS, supra note 11, at 40.
149.
Id.
150.
David S. Mitchell, The Prohibitionof Rape in InternationalHumanitarian
151.
Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
219, 229-30 (2005).
152.
See ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 4 (outlining the various rights that may not
be suspended by states party, even in the midst of a state of emergency).
Responsibility to protect is markedly similar in application to the
153.
substance-infused concept of sovereignty in the people advocated here. See Synopsis to
ICISS REPORT, supra note 48, at XI ("Where a population is suffering serious
harm . . . the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.").
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Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC). 5 4 The Rome Statute serves as a source of
duties independent of the responsibility to protect. The crimes listed
within it are universal, which means they can be prosecuted by any
state against the leadership of another state or by the ICC against
signatories to the Rome Statute. 55
Notably missing from this list of fundamental human rights so
far are socioeconomic rights. Despite vigorous arguments in favor of
establishing socioeconomic rights as customary law,156 these rights
often provoke controversy. They tend to be broad rights that when
enforced could violate the separation of powers between the courts
and legislature and cost significant amounts of money to
implement.157 Some scholars view them merely as benefits or
aspirations rather than rights.15 8 Despite this debate, some
socioeconomic rights are so fundamental to survival and therefore to
the exercise of self-determination or the people's will, that their
protection and promotion must be considered a duty that
governments must discharge to invoke sovereign rights. 5 9 Included
among the duties are access to basic healthcare, food, water, shelter
and education. 6 0
To prevent poorer countries from losing their claim to sovereign
rights for no other reason than they lack the resources to fulfill these
duties-which would be grossly unfair to the people-violations of
socioeconomic rights must be intended to oppress some or all of the
people or must be done with little regard to the severe harm these
violations will cause them. For example, a government that has
insufficient food to feed its population during a famine does not
violate its duty to the people; if the same government, however,
refuses aid that could alleviate starvation, it would not be entitled to

3.30-.31.
154.
ICISS REPORT, supra note 48, at
155.
In limited circumstances, the UN Security Council can refer a nonparty
state to the court when acting under its UN Charter, Chapter VII obligations. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998) (amended 1999).
156.
See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, Rep. on its 26th
Sess., Aug. 13-31, 2001, 1 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69 (Aug. 31, 2001) (rejecting
Israel's "distinction between human rights and humanitarian law").
157.
See BRIAN OREND, HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 30-31 (2002)
(discussing some of the costs associated with human rights).
158.
Id.
See Alanna Chang, South Africa: The Up Down, an Application of a
159.
Downstream Model To Enforce Positive Socio-Economic Rights, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
621, 667 (2007) (noting that the drafters of South Africa's constitution recognized the
importance of socioeconomic rights).
160.
See OREND, supra note 157, at 31 (discussing the social costs of providing
water, education, and basic healthcare as economic and social rights); Chang, supra
note 159, at 638 (listing food and shelter as basic entitlements).
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sovereign rights. A government that denies girls and women
education would similarly violate its duty to the people, whereas a
government with insufficient resources to guarantee access to
education to its entire population would not. The question is whether
the government deliberately undertook a policy to violate these rights
to the severe detriment of the people.
National constitutions provide the final source of obligations a
government owes its constituency before claiming sovereign rights. A
constitution may provide the best insight into the will and common
good of the people or the rights they consider most fundamental.161 It
could also reflect the will of an authoritarian government, making
some state constitutions less appropriate sources. Regardless, if a
government bases its claim of legitimacy on the power it receives
from a constitution, then it inherently recognizes that it is subject to
the limitations and responsibilities written into that constitution.' 6 2
The list of fundamental human rights catalogued here outline
the bare minimum a government has a duty to protect in order to
attain sovereign rights. The list is very conservative, as it
predominantly reflects international agreement on fundamental
rights. It in no way should be treated as fully inclusive of all rights
and duties owed to the people; instead, it offers a starting point for
developing sovereign duties.
3.

The Question of Cultural Relativism

The primary challenge to this list of duties required for a
government to claim sovereign rights is likely to be that it risks
cultural imperialism by relying on international law. Critics of
international human rights law often argue that it amounts to little
more than a paternalistic attempt to foist Western values on cultures
that prioritize or interpret rights differently.' 6 3 They argue that the

161.
See Philpott, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that "domestic constitutions and
international agreements define the scope of all rulers' and citizens' legitimate
authority").
162.
See MILLS, supra note 11, at 38 (noting that any claim to legal power will
correspondingly have specific limits that must also be followed).
163.
Hal Blanchard, Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: "Seeking Truth
from Facts," 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 365, 397 (2005) ("[Tjhe very idea of human rights has
come to be regarded by many Chinese as a heavy-handed and moralistic slogan
allowing no room for differences in history, traditions and culture."); Sharon K. Hom,
Commentary, Re-PositioningHuman Rights Discourse on 'Asian" Perspectives, 3 BUFF.
J. INT'L L. 209, 209 (1996) (noting "a suspicion that assertions of Western universal
human rights are pretexts for intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries");
Thio Li-ann, "Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication": A Critical and
Empirical Inquiry into Singapore's Engagement with International Human Rights
Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. & CONTRIBUTORS 41, 50-51 (2004) (describing Singapore's
approach to human rights as guided by the cultural relativist tradition, which, in
contrast to many Western nations, considers human rights in the context of a culture
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choice of rights protected under international law and deemed
universal depends on Western cultural preferences, values, and
socioeconomic conditions. Instead, these critics believe that
prioritization of human rights should depend on context, particularly
the culture and history of the people claiming those rights. If each
culture prioritizes and interprets rights differently, then there is no
one set of human rights considered fundamental.164
This position adopts cultural relativism, which is often invoked
by countries that preference communitarian values and group rights
over individual rights to promote community harmony.165 They
believe that individuals owe a duty of care to the community and
should not simply receive individual entitlements. 166 For these
relativists, promoting individual rights over communitarian or group
rights could undermine the social fabric of society. 167
The concern with relying on cultural and communitarian values
to form the duties of governments is that they may impose a view of
the common good and pretend a collective will of the people rather
than reflect a true consensus. Cultures and religions are not
monolithic; nor are they free of the power struggles for influence that
exist within any community of people.' 6 8 Because not all individuals
have equal power within a group, not all members have the
opportunity to determine the group's values.' 69 Using communitarian
values to prevent individuals from exercising their individual rights
results in the same paternalism cultural relativists claim pervades

rather than as one set of dogmatic rights); Gracie Ming Zhao, Challenging Traditions:
Human Rights and Trafficking of Women in China, 6 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 167, 169
(2004) (discussing the differences in the perception of human rights in developing
countries versus developed countries).
164.
Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the
Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 532
(2001) (describing the difficulty in creating one set of human rights given the cultural
differences that exist around the world).
165.
See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a
Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1097-98
(2000) (noting the variety of positions held by cultural relativists); Seth R. Harris,
Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY J. 1, 14
(2000) (describing how Indonesia prioritizes economic rights over rights of the
individual); Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 93-94 (1996) (discussing the differences "over the scope and
priorities of the international human rights agenda"); Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial:
What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the Future of Its Customary Law,
21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 62, 70 (2003) (arguing that customary law governs South
Africa's citizens).
166.
Ludsin, supra note 165.
167.
Ghai, supra note 165.
168.
See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 165, at 111-13 (discussing the inconsistencies
found in cultural relativism).
169.
Id. at 111-12.
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the concept of universal human rights.17 0 In contrast, the individual
rights that form the basis of governmental duties are intended to
create the best opportunity for individuals to exercise their autonomy,
which in turns lets them express themselves as individuals and as
part of a group. 171
The concept of sovereignty in the people does not reject group or
communitarian rights; instead, it demands that the government
govern according to the will and common good of all the people or risk
losing its sovereign rights. Group rights can promote selfdetermination by protecting the benefits members gain from their
communityl 72 and, as briefly mentioned in Part III.B.2, may be
necessary to ensure full democratic participation of minority
groups. 7 3 The caveat, however, is that group rights are inappropriate
when used against group members or against minority groups to
restrict autonomy, equality, and other fundamental rights.
Another point countering a potential claim of cultural relativism
in the list of duties for governments is that the rights chosen protect
the values of "justice, equality, and fairness"174-values found in all
cultures and religions.175 As with sovereignty, governments often
resort to cultural relativism to shield themselves from criticism of
human rights abuses. 176 Claims of cultural relativism need to be

See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 164, at 590-92 (analyzing the legitimacy of
170.
coercion in enforcing international human rights).
See William M. Carter, Jr., Book Review: The Mote in Thy Brother's Eye, 20
171.
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 496, 499 (2002) (reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS
AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001) (arguing that protecting an individual's autonomy is
critical "to the success of the human rights movement").
Group rights are rights that "derive[ I from a person's membership in a
172.
group rather than her status as an individual; these rights can belong to the group or
to the individual as part of his/her membership in the group." HALLIE LUDSIN, WOMEN
AND THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF PALESTINE 110 (Women's Ctr. for Legal Aid &
Counseling ed., 2011).
See, e.g., Helen Quane, Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications
173.
of Using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 496
(2007) (describing how protection of individuals from discrimination or providing
equality does not prevent involuntary assimilation of minority groups into the majority
society); Sloane, supra note 164, at 540-54 (noting that cultural pluralism requires
some forms of minority-group protection against the politically dominant culture).
See, e.g., Ghai, supra note 165 (arguing that cultural relativists support
174.
universalism based on their own cultural and religious values).
See, e.g., id. (noting that Easterners claim that "justice, equality, and
175.
fairness" are foundations of their rights).
See, e.g., Ida L. Bostian, Cultural Relativism in International War Crimes
176.
Prosecutions: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 12 INT'L L. STUDENTS
AsS'N J. INT'L & COMP. L 1, 5 (2005) (recognizing that regimes often use cultural
relativism arguments "to avoid responsibility for human rights violations"); Katie L.
Zaunbrecher, Comment, When Culture Hurts: Dispelling the Myth of Cultural
Justificationfor Gender-Based Human Rights Violations, 33 Hous. J. INT'L L. 679, 687
(2011) (exploring "[t]he tension between the universality of international human rights
law and the cultural defense").
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parsed to determine whether they are a crude attempt to justify
human rights violations or whether any of the rights identified as
fundamental in this Article in fact undermine the values of any
culture or religion.
Cultural relativism is also invoked by underdeveloped societies
that challenge universal human rights on the basis they exclude
socioeconomic rights.1 77 These critics argue that developed countries,
which have a less urgent need for socioeconomic rights, dominate the
debate over which rights qualify as fundamental, 7 8 although survival
and a decent quality of life are of greatest concern to most people.' 7 9
As described above, sovereignty in the people, as conceived of here,
requires governments to guarantee socioeconomic rights to qualify for
sovereign rights, which dispenses with this aspect of cultural
relativism.

C. How Much Sovereignty Is Lost?
A government that fails to achieve legitimacy and to meet its
duties to the people loses some or all of its authority to act on their
behalf. Sovereignty itself is not lost, since that belongs to the people.
Nor does the territory lose its claim to statehood since, at least in
most cases, it will continue to meet the four criteria for recognition as
a state. Instead, the government loses its entitlement to claim the
sovereign rights that derive from serving as the legitimate
representative of the people within a state, particularly the right to
be free from interference in domestic affairs.
The first question this conception of conditional sovereignty
raises is to what extent sovereign rights are lost by a violation of
duties? 80 The answer depends on the severity of the violations. The
loss of sovereign rights should be proportionate to the degree to which
governments violate these duties and the harm the violations cause.
A dictatorial regime that already fails the legitimacy test and that
commits gross violations of human rights loses all of its sovereign

See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 165 ("[Non-Western states have argued that
177.
the very hierarchy of human rights established in those instruments privileges civil
and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights in a way that is biased
toward both Western political traditions and the wealth of Western states . . . ."); Zhao,
supra note 163 (noting that African and Asian countries as well as the precolonial
states followed cultural relativism).
178.
Higgins, supranote 165.
179.
See, e.g., Zhao, supra note 163 (recognizing that people in developing
countries are most concerned with socioeconomic rights).
180.
While a government must be legitimate as well as meet its duties to its
constituency to receive sovereign rights, it is hard to imagine a situation in which an
illegitimate government is fulfilling its duties to the people. For this reason, the
question of whether and how much sovereignty is lost likely depends on the duties
requirement.
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rights. A representative government that violates its duties to the
people on a much smaller scale retains sovereign authority in most
areas and therefore most of its sovereign rights, but not the right to
demand noninterference in relation to those specific violations.
The proportionality requirement for determining the amount of
sovereign rights lost as a result of violating sovereign duties is
identical to the proportionality requirement for determining the
appropriate level of intervention. As the harm to the people grows in
severity, so does the amount of permissible intervention. The
international community can "intervene" through criticism;
conditions on aid, trade, and diplomatic relations; political and
economic sanctions; international investigations;
prosecution;
political and financial support to opposition or insurgent groups; and,
as a last resort, military action.181 A factor in the proportionality test
for determining appropriate intervention is whether the proposed
intervention will cause more harm than good. For example, cutting
off international aid or limiting trade for lesser abuses of human
rights could cause disproportionate harm to the people and increase
their disadvantages and suffering. The more severe the harm, the
less likely intervention will have a disproportionately negative impact
on the population compared to the human rights abuses. Testing
whether the loss of sovereignty and corresponding intervention is
proportional to the severity of the human rights abuses corresponds
with current international practice that, for example, permits
military intervention only when a threat to international peace exists
or in the face of human rights atrocities. 182 The understanding of
sovereignty in the people described in this Article explains, or for
some justifies, that practice rather than supplants it.

181.
See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of
Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), Doc. No. 10198/1/04 REV 1 (June 7, 2004), available
at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/stlO/stl0198-re01.enO4.pdf (describing
a policy framework for sanctions); Robin Geiss, HumanitarianSafeguards in Economic
Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and
Follow-Up Assessment of Long-Term Effects, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 167, 174 & n.41
(2005) (noting that the principle of proportionality binds UN Security Council action);
Milena Sterio, The Evolution of InternationalLaw, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213,
232 (2008) (discussing the report by the ICISS); InternationalSanctions, GOV'T OFFS.
SWED., http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/9279 (last updated Oct. 17, 2011) (detailing
Sweden's policies on international sanctions); Anna Segall, Economic Sanctions: Legal
1999),
and Policy Constraints, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Dec. 31,
(discussing the UN
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq73.htm
Security Council's use of economic sanctions).
182.
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 42 (declaring the actions available to UN
members if Article 41 measures prove inadequate); Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justification
for HumanitarianIntervention: Will the Continent Matter?, 35 INT'L LAW. 1027, 1037
(2001) (discussing the "[j]ustification[s] for an international intervention"); see also
Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 55 & n.321 (2001) (noting that few courts have addressed the proportionality
requirements of sanctions).
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More complex is the question of what threshold the violations
must pass before a government loses some or all of its sovereign
authority and corresponding rights. No government is perfect and
every government will commit injustices, so the threshold must be
reasonable or else no government will be entitled to claim sovereign
rights, no matter how much it represents the will and common good
of the people. At a minimum, the violation of duties toward the people
must be systemic before any portion of sovereign rights is lost. It
seems unfair to the people as a whole to have its government lose its
sovereign entitlements over more isolated incidents. 83
In addition, the state must lack effective domestic accountability
to correct government failures and to hold political leaders and
institutions responsible for any violations of duties to the people.
Accountability requires meaningful action in a relatively short period
of time and with relative ease and predictability. 184 If real
accountability exists, systemic violations of duties will be corrected
domestically and without the need for international intervention.
This requirement recognizes that the government holds the primary
responsibility for meeting its sovereign duties and that international
intervention is appropriate only when the government shirks its
responsibility to the people.' 8 5
The next element of the threshold test for loss of sovereign rights
is the severity of harm. Loss of sovereign rights will be overly harsh
in the face of minor harm; only significant harm will justify these
consequences.18 6 The proportionality test that determines the amount

183.
Overall context, however, must be considered before assuming any
incidents are isolated. If context shows that seemingly isolated incidents create severe
harm in the aggregate, then the threshold may be met after all.
184.
Government decisions and behavior lack accountability, for example, if
there is no independent body capable of ensuring that those decisions or behavior
comply with the rule of law, or if the government employs stalling tactics to avoid
judgment on those decisions or the behavior. See, e.g., Joel M. Ngugi, Policing NeoLiberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive Discourse,26 U. PA.
J. INT'L EcON. L. 513, 540-41 (2005) (noting that transparency, access to justice, and
judicial independence are three conditions "essential to the actualization of the rule of
law").
185.
See, e.g., Gareth Evans, President, Int'l Crisis Grp., Presentation to the
Panel Discussion on the Responsibility To Protect: Ensuring Effective Protection of
Populations Under Threat of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, United Nations,
N.Y.: Gareth Evans Offers Five Thoughts for Policy Makers on R2P (Apr. 13, 2007),
transcript available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2007/
evans-responsibility-to-protect-in-2007-five-thoughts-for-policy-makers.aspx
(describing how the responsibility to protect first falls on the domestic government and
how intervention is only appropriate if that government is "unable or unwilling to
exercise that responsibility that any responsibility shifted to the wider international
community").
It is irrelevant to the analysis of the threshold for a loss of sovereignty
186.
whether the government violates one duty or all of its duties as the issue is the severity
of the harm caused by each violation or the violations in the aggregate.
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of sovereignty lost and the appropriate level of intervention will take
care of this aspect of the threshold test. If the breach of duties does
not warrant international intervention under the proportionality test,
then the severity of harm does not pass the threshold test for
intervention. So far, however, violations of the duties listed above are
likely to cause severe harm to some or all of the people, which means
nearly any systemic violation of duties will pass the threshold test. To
the extent the list of duties is developed to include protections of
other human rights, the test for severity of harm may be more than
rhetorical.
While severity of harm plays a role in determining whether
intervention is appropriate, this understanding of sovereignty in the
people should not be confused with the doctrine of responsibility to
protect. Sovereign rights can be lost for abuses that do not reach the
level of harm that triggers the international community's duty to
protect the people of another state. The duties that must be fulfilled
by a government to achieve the benefits of sovereignty are far more
comprehensive than the duties placed on a government by the
responsibility to protect. The difference is that the international
community will not be obligated to intervene in the face of other
violations of duties, but instead have the discretion to do so without
violating sovereignty in the people.
Finally, even if all of these other tests are met, another question
that must be asked is whether the people whose rights are being
violated wish for intervention. Given the severity of harm that results
from the violations of duties necessary for retaining sovereign rights,
to some extent it can be assumed intervention will be welcome. When
that assumption is demonstrably false, then the international
community may need to refrain from intervention to avoid acting out
of paternalism.1 8 7
In conclusion, a government loses its sovereign rights when it
fails to achieve legitimacy and violates the duties necessary to serve
as the people's representative. The threshold for determining whether
a state loses some or all of its sovereign rights is whether (1) the
violations of duties are systemic, (2) the state lacks domestic
accountability for the violations, and (3) the violations cause
significant harm. The determination of the last element could depend
in part on whether intervention or loss of sovereignty will do more
harm than good to the people and whether the people wish for
intervention. The loss of sovereign rights may be restricted to only
partial areas of government control or cover all claims to sovereign

It is possible to imagine the situation where "the people" whose rights are
187.
being violated fear that international intervention will result in a severe backlash.
Whether to defer to "the will" of the people will depend on the severity of the risk they
face.
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rights. The amount of sovereignty lost and the amount of permissible
intervention should be proportionate to the harm caused by the
violation of the conditions for retaining sovereign authority.

D. Who Decides?
The question of who decides whether and how much sovereignty
is lost is likely to be a source of contention for those considering the
concept of sovereignty in the people as espoused here. The question
reflects two fears. The first is that this conception of sovereignty in
the people will allow states to freely intervene in each other's
domestic politics, wholly undermining the overall purpose of
sovereignty. The purpose of this concept is to provide governments
with the rationale for overriding sovereignty claims when they have
the political will to challenge human rights violations; it is not
intended to change international relations practices. The vast
majority of options for intervention are nonmilitary, which means
they do not breach territorial integrity or constitute "acts of
aggression" in the context of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute of
the ICC.18 8 They range from public censure; to limiting or cutting aid,
trade, or diplomatic ties; to political or economic sanctions; to
investigations and prosecutions of abuses.189 These nonmilitary
measures, when applied bilaterally or against the actions of people or
entities under the jurisdiction of the intervening state, also constitute
acts of sovereignty by that state because it chooses how to conduct its
international relations. 190 Whether to censure a country, to permit a
diplomatic mission to work within its jurisdiction, to conduct trade or
give aid, or to impose sanctions on citizens or legal persons within its
territory for transacting with a disfavored state all fall well within
the sovereign powers of a state.1 91

188.
As of yet, there is no universally accepted or applied definition of "acts of
aggression." With that said, the focus of the discussion of the definition for a crime of
aggression for the ICC was on prohibiting "being in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State." Rep. of the
Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1-12, 2002, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 3 (July 24, 2002).
189.
See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 164, at 590-92 (analyzing the legitimacy of
coercion in enforcing international human rights).
190.
See, e.g., Hossein Askari et al., Measuring Vulnerability to U.S. Foreign
Economic Sanctions, 40 Bus. ECON. 41, 42 (2005) (describing economic sanctions as a
matter of "foreign policy"); Cleveland, supra note 182, at 53 (describing how "because
economic assistance is voluntary and given at the donor country's discretion, the use of
foreign assistance to alter a foreign state's behavior may not be subject" to the norm of
nonintervention).
191.
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 104-05 (June 27) (concluding that economic sanctions
do not violate the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of another state).
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The fact that decisions on nonmilitary intervention are likely
matters of government policy suggests that it is unnecessary to look
at them as a breach of sovereignty of the targeted countries. Abusive
governments would deny this suggestion, which makes a theory to
counter the attempt to shield human rights violations behind
sovereignty important. Further, developing countries have raised
serious concerns with economic sanctions because they can cause
severe harm, and as a result, act as a particularly potent form of
coercive power. 9 2 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to
urge states party to mandate that only UN agencies have the power
to impose economic sanctions.' 93 The theory of sovereignty in the
people addresses concerns about the harm caused by intervention,
including through economic sanctions, by requiring states to test
whether the effects of their intervention are likely to be proportionate
to the harm from the rights violations and whether the intervention
is likely to do more harm than good. It takes a different approach to
alleviating the fears of developing countries.
The more difficult question of who decides whether sovereign
rights are lost arises when there is the possibility of aggressive action
by an intervening state. These aggressive actions range from
dropping aid within the territory of another state without its consent,
to funding armed groups and agitators, to engaging in military
activities in another state's territory. The question of who should
decide whether aggressive or military intervention is appropriate
under the concept of sovereignty in the people is part of an existing,
highly contentious debate on whether these actions can be unilateral,
multilateral, or must be undertaken only with the consent of the UN
Security Council.' 94 The debate implicates this conception of
sovereignty in the people; however, it is beyond the scope of this

U.N. Secretary-General, Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of
192.
Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/66/138 (July 14, 2011).
193.
Id. at 3.
194.
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, HumanitarianIntervention and Pretexts for War,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 108 (2006) (contending that unilateral humanitarian
intervention should be legalized); Nico Krisch, Review Essay: Legality, Morality and the
Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323, 323
(2002) (reviewing five humanitarian intervention works); Saira Mohamed,
Restructuringthe Debate on UnauthorizedHumanitarianIntervention, 88 N.C. L. REV.
1275, 1276 (2010) (arguing that policy makers should consider responding to human
rights abuses without the use of military force); Daphn6 Richemond, Normativity in
InternationalLaw: The Case of Unilateral HumanitarianIntervention, 6 YALE HUM.
RTs. & DEv. L.J. 45, 45 (2003) (arguing that the current regime "governing unilateral
humanitarian intervention provides an adequate legal framework for such
intervention"); Fernando R. Tes6n, The Vexing Problem of Authority in Humanitarian
Intervention: A Proposal,24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 761, 763 (2006) (proposing that a Court of
Human Security oversee all responses to humanitarian crises rather than the Security
Council).
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Article to determine who should be permitted to order an aggressive
intervention into another state. Rather, the concept simply explains
why, in certain circumstances, sovereign rights do not bar this
intervention.
The second fear that this Article's conception of sovereignty in
the people raises with respect to who will decide whether and to what
extent sovereign rights are lost is whether this concept will permit
stronger countries to interfere with weaker countries for their own
benefit. 19 5 Justifiable intervention can easily be invoked by more
powerful states in their self-interest, while weaker nations are more
likely to be on the receiving end of condemnation and intervention,
19 6
unable to influence the human rights practices of stronger states.
This concern also raises the specter of selective enforcement of
human rights or selective intervention. Rather than applying human
rights standards uniformly, factors such as race, ethnicity, religion,
and location of the abusive government also could play a role in the
decision whether to intervene to stop human rights abuses.
While the fear of selective enforcement of sovereignty in the
people is legitimate, it should not be permitted to serve as a pretext
for avoiding criticisms of human rights violations or for negating the
concept of sovereignty in the people. The problem of selective
enforcement is not an inherent problem in the concept, but rather a
reflection of current politics. In fact, state-centric conceptions of
sovereignty that allow governments to hide their abuses from
international scrutiny deserve at least partial blame for inconsistent
responses to human rights violations.1 9 7 Selective enforcement
undermines the purpose of sovereignty in the people; however, as one
commentator discussed with respect to the responsibility to protect,

195.
See Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of HumanitarianIntervention:
Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1778 (2000) (describing how in the
past, "the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was at times misused by strong states
as a pretext for vigilante activity and for the occupation of weaker and politically
disobedient countries"); Priyankar Upadhyaya, Human Security, Humanitarian
Intervention, and Third World Concerns, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 85 (2004)
(discussing how some third-world analysts consider humanitarian intervention to be
discriminatory because it invariably only applies to "powerless third world countries").
See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 17, at 924-25 ("[Slome states are weaker than
196.
others in their ability to participate in, influence, or dominate international legal
processes."); Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian
Interventions Under International Law, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 1, 10-11 (2001)
('Humanitarian intervention' is a high-sounding and convenient tool for maintaining,
and yet concealing, [a strong state's] dominance and their supremacy.").
Treating the state as sovereign permits governments, even those that do
197.
not represent their populations, to design the international enforcement mechanisms.
Consistent with government interest and with the belief that states must choose to be
bound by international law, these bodies rarely are given the power to act meaningfully
in response to human rights abuses and depend almost wholly on government
permission to submit to enforcement processes. State-centric sovereignty, thus,
correlates directly with weak human rights enforcement.
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"the quest for the universal and uniform application of a new
principle should not lead to its abandonment, especially when it can
save hapless individuals from a grim plight."1 98
E. Libya: Nascent Support for a Substantive Sovereignty
in the People
There is little doubt that an autocratic government inherently
violates the concept of sovereignty in the people. A dictatorship that
does not permit free and fair elections and violates most human
rights cannot qualify for sovereign rights. This is a basic premise of
this Article. What bears discussing here is how the international
community effectively applied the concept of sovereignty in the people
to the Libyan protest movement that erupted as part of the Arab
Spring when adopting UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and
1973. As Part III.E.1 explains, the process leading up to international
intervention in Libya to prevent Muammar Qadaffi's forces from
slaughtering civilians recognized that Qaddafi's legitimacy depended
on the support of the people; the Security Council was willing to
consider action in response to the call of the people. Part III.E.2 then
asserts that international intervention was expressly justified on the
basis that Qaddafi had violated his duties to the people as required by
the responsibility to protect. Taking this reasoning together,
international intervention in Libya lends nascent support for the
basic tenets of a substance-infused concept of sovereignty in the
people and shows its potential force.
1.

Background

Libya's Arab Spring began on February 15, 2011, with protests
in the city of Benghazi that spread quickly through eastern Libya and
Tripoli. 99 Qaddafi reacted to the protests by killing and arresting
demonstrators.2 00 Thousands continued to protest despite the

198.
Sumit Ganguly, The Morality of Responsibility, ASIAN AGE (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.asianage.com/columnists/morality-responsibility-577.
INT'L CRISIS GRP., POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
199.
EAST (V): MAKING SENSE OF LIBYA, MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT N.1l07, at 1
(2011). The protests apparently began after a lawyer working for the families of victims
of the Abu Salim prison killings in 1996 was arrested. Libya: Arrests, Assaults in
Advance of Planned Protests, HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Feb.
17,
2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/libya-arrests-assaults-advance-planned-protests
[hereinafter Libya: Arrests].
200.
Libya: Arrests, supra note 199; Libya: Security Forces Fire on 'Day of Anger'
Demonstrations, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/
201 1/02/17/libya-security-forces-fire-day-anger-demonstrations; Libya: Security Forces
Kill 84 over Three Days, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/02/18/libya-security-forces-kill-84-over-three-days; Middle East and North
Africa in Turmoil, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/speciall
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government's harsh response that within the first four days left
approximately 233 dead and many injured. 201 By February 18, the
demonstrations turned into a full-fledged rebellion, with protestors
pushing security forces out of parts of Benghazi and the city of
Bayda.20 2 Qaddafi responded in a speech on February 22 by calling
for "house by house" searches for the "cockroaches" opposing the
regime, 203 which was interpreted as "giv[ing] the green light" to
loyalists to kill protestors and opponents. 204
In response to the government's violent crackdown, on February
21, 2011, Libya's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim
Dabbashi, declared that he was breaking from the Qaddafi
government but would continue to represent the Libyan people in his
official capacity. Dabbashi expressly stated that he was not
resigning: 205 "The Libyan mission will be in the service of the Libyan
people rather than in service of the Libyan regime or of one
person." 206 Similarly, Ali Adjali, Libya's Ambassador to the United
States, stated: "I'm (not) resigning Moammar Gadhafi's government,
but I am with the people. I am representing the people in the street,
the people who've been killed, the people who've been destroyed.
Their life is in danger."20 7 Qaddafi pulled their diplomatic credentials,

world/middle-east-protests/ (last updated Oct. 23, 2011) (click "Libya" to view statistics
for that country).
201.
Libya: Governments Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings, Hum. RTS.
WATCH (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/libya-governmentsshould-demand-end-unlawful-killings.
202.
Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/25/world/middleeast/map-of-how-theprotests-unfolded-in-libya.html.
203.
Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well After Libya, in ETHICS &
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1, 1 (2011). His reference to protestors and rebels as
"cockroaches" struck a chord internationally as "eerily echoing the term used in 1994
by Rwanda's murderous regime." Id.
204.
Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi's Grip on the Capital
Tightens as Revolt Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/23/worldlafrica/23ibya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
205.
Edith M. Lederer, Moammar Gadhafi Should Step Down: Libyan UN
Diplomats,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS/HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/2 1/moammar-gadhafi-should-st n_826267.html.
Libya's Ambassador in Washington, Ali Adjali, reportedly made a similar statement that
he was not resigning, but rather remaining to represent the people, not Qaddafi. Id.
206.
Jihad Taki, Libyan Ambassador to UN Urges International Community to
Stop
Genocide,
GLOBAL
ARAB
NETWORK
(Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201102219941/Libya-Politics/libyanambassador-to-un-urges-international-community-to-stop-genocide.html; see also Colin
Moynihan, Libya's UN Diplomats Break with Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0 (quoting Dabbashi:
"We state clearly that the Libyan Mission is a mission for the Libyan people ... it is not
for the regime").
207.
Lederer, supra note 205.
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but the United Nations granted the Libyan UN mission "courtesy
passes allowing unlimited access to U.N. headquarters."2 08
Acting as a UN diplomatic representative, on February 21
Dabbashi sent a letter to the UN Security Council requesting an
09
and in
urgent meeting to address the safety of Libyan civilians,2
particular seeking the installation of a no-fly zone to prevent Qaddafi
210
from attacking civilians and protection for Libya's oil installations.
Based on this request, the Security Council met the next day and
denounced Qaddafi's violent crackdown, calling on him to fulfill his
"responsibility to protect" Libya's citizens.2 11
The Security Council met again on February 25 to discuss a draft
resolution in response to unfolding government suppression in Libya.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, which
referred the events in Libya for an investigation by the ICC,
established an arms embargo, and instituted an asset freeze and
travel ban on certain members of the Qaddafi government. 212 During
discussions, the Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations,
Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, initially a committed Qaddafi
supporter even as Dabbashi and other Libyan diplomats broke with
the official government, denounced Libya's dictator and made an
impassioned plea for intervention to prevent further bloodshed. 213 He
also submitted a letter to the Security Council in support of a
resolution allowing for international intervention on behalf of the
Libyan people. 214

208.
Anita Snow, UN Diplomat Works Against Gadhafi, Fox NEWS (April 27,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/27/ap-interview-diplomat-works-gadhafil.
Letter Dated 21 February 2011 from the Charg6 d'Affaires a.i. of the
209.
Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/102 (Feb. 22, 2011); U.N.
Security Council Discusses Libya Crisis, REUTERS AFRICA (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://af.reuters.comlarticle/libyaNewsidAFN2227673120110222.
210.
Insights on Libya, WHAT'S IN BLUE (Feb. 21, 2011, 11:40 AM),
http://whatsinblue.org/2011/02/insights-on-libya-1.php.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
211.
Libya, U.N. Press Release SC/10180 (Feb. 22, 201-1).
U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.691
212.
(Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970, 4-21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6490th mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6490
213.
(Feb. 25, 2011).
214.
Matthew Russell Lee, As Libya's Shalgam Supports Referral to ICC, Spin of
France & NGO, Human Rights, INNER CITY PRESS (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://www.innercitypress.com/unuk7libya022611.html ("With reference to the Draft
Resolution on Libya before the Security Council, I have the honour to confirm that the
Libyan Delegation to the United Nations supports the measures proposed in the draft
resolution to hold to account those responsible for the armed attacks against Libyan
Civilians... .").
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The National Transitional Council of Libya formed on February
26 as the rebel political leadership fighting Qaddafi and his forces. 215
The rebels were making significant advances throughout eastern
Libya while Qaddafi forces used air attacks to drive them back. 216
Throughout early March, there were reports of government
supporters firing on unarmed protestors and, in Tripoli, of Qaddafi
loyalists searching for people in photographs taken during protests to
detain or kill them. 217 On March 10, France became the first country
to officially recognize the rebel forces as Libya's "legitimate
representative," a move supported by the European Parliament. 218
By March 12, Qaddafi's forces had succeeded in winning back
control of some areas captured by rebel forces, leading the Arab
League to ask the UN Security Council to establish a no-fly zone over
Libya. 219 Many feared that Qaddafi would succeed in crushing the
rebellion and that the reprisals would be severe. By March 16, the
United States began pushing for military support of the rebel forces,
believing a no-fly zone would be insufficient to support the rebel
movement. 220 On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1973, which demanded a ceasefire, created a no-fly zone, permitted
UN members to take "all necessary measures" short of occupation to
protect Libya's civilian population, and increased sanctions against
Qaddafi and his minions. 221 Acting on the basis of the Resolution, on
March 20 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
attacked Qaddafi forces that were assaulting rebel-held areas. 222 On
March 21, Libya's Foreign Minister, part of the Qaddafi government,
requested an emergency meeting to stop what he described as French
and American "military aggression" taken in accordance to Resolution

215.
Libya Opposition Launches Council, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011227175955221853.html.
216.
Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Government Presses
Assault in East and West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/
08/worldlafrica/08libya.html?pagewanted=all.
217.
David D. Kirkpatrick, Terror Quiets Libyan Capital as Rebels Battle in the
East, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/worldlafrica/
041ibya.htm1?pagewanted=a11.
218.
Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government, BBC NEWS EUR. (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12699183.
219.
Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone
over Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/
middleeast/13libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
220.
Mark Landler & Dan Bilefsky, Specter ofRebel Rout Helps Shift U.S. Policy
on Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/world/
africa/17diplomacy.html?_r=0.
221.
S.C. Res. 1973, 1$ 1-18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
222.
Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC NEWS AFR. (Mar.
20, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 12796972.
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1973.223 The United Nations did not act on this request. On October
23, the rebels declared victory over Qaddafi and his forces. 224

2.

Legitimacy

The Security Council's decisions along the path to adopting
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 provide budding support for a substanceinfused concept of sovereignty in the people, which prevents
governments from claiming the sovereign right to be free from
international intervention when they fail to retain domestic
legitimacy and violate fundamental duties owed to the people. From
the very beginning, the Security Council treated the Libyan protests
as a direct repudiation of Qaddafi's legitimacy. It accepted Dabbashi's
request for a Security Council meeting on Libya although he had
defected from the Qaddafi government and Qaddafi had formally
revoked his credentials as a Libyan diplomat. The Provisional Rules
of Procedure of the Security Council state that the president can call
a meeting if there is a dispute under Article 35 or Article 11(2) that is
brought to it by a state party. 225 By convening a meeting at
Dabbashi's request, the Security Council implicitly recognized him as
Libya's legitimate representative; the source of Dabbashi's authority
was no longer Qaddafi, but the people. Similarly, when the Security
Council met to discuss draft resolution 1970, the Security Council
invited Ambassador Shalgham to the meeting under Rule of
Procedure 37, which permits the Security Council to invite a memberstate that is not a member of the Security Council to meetings to
discuss a resolution affecting it.2 26 The Security Council expressly
acknowledged Shalgham as the "representative of the Libyan Aram
Jamahiriya," despite having formally broken with the ruler in control
of the government.2 2 7 Again, the source of his authority as Libya's
representative was the people-not Qaddafi, who had revoked
Shalgham's diplomatic credentials.
The international community specifically justified support for
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 as a response to a call by the people to

223.
Edith M. Lederer, UN Rejects Emergency Meeting Sought by Libya,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/feedarticle/9557569.
224.
Adam Nossiter & Kareem Fahim, Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official
Vows
a New
and More Pious State, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/worldlafrica/revolution-won-top-libyan-officialvows-a-new-and-more-pious-state.html?pagewanted=all.
225.
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, r. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/96/Rev.7 (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter Provisional Rules]; see also U.N. Charter arts.
11(2), 35.
226.
U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6490th mtg., supra note 213; Provisional
Rules, supra note 225, r. 37.
227.
U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6490th mtg., supra note 213, 4 ("I now
give the floor to the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamarhiriya.").
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return sovereignty to them. The British Ambassador to the United
Nations described Resolution 1970 as "a powerful signal of the
determination of the international community to stand with the
people of Libya and defend their right to determine their own
future."2 28 South Africa's representative described how "[t]he Libyan
people ... have been calling for an end to this indiscriminate use of
force" as "echo[ed]" by Libyan diplomats. 229 Resolution 1970 took
particular note of the letter Shaigham wrote to the Security Council
stating support for the resolution's measures;2 3 0 reference to the
letter implied that Shalgham's support represented the people's
support. 231
The adoption of Resolution 1973 also was justified on the basis
that it reflected the wishes of the people. The U.S. representative to
the Security Council considered it a "respon[se] to the Libyan people's
cry for help." 232 The British representative noted that "[t]he central
purpose of the resolution is clear: to end the violence, to protect
civilians and to allow the people of Libya to determine their own
future."2 3 3 The Portuguese representative described how "[flor the
international community, the regime that has ruled Libya for more
than 40 years has come to an end by the will of the Libyan People."234
The rejection of Qaddafi as the legitimate Libyan leader is most
apparent in the decision to refuse Qaddafl's request for a Security
Council meeting,2 35 which India's UN ambassador explained reflected
that the Security Council "didn't want to get into a discussion of who
represents whom."23 6

U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg., supranote 212, at 2.
228.
229.
Id. The U.S. representative stated: "The protests in Libya are being driven
by the people of Libya. This is about people's ability to shape their own future,
wherever they may be. . . . The Security Council has acted today to support the Libyan
people's universal rights." Id. at 3-4 (asserting that, "As President Obama said today,
when a leader's only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against its own
people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country,
by leaving now.").
S.C. Res. 1970, supranote 212.
230.
231.
But see Ronda Hauben, The Role of the UN Security Council in Unleashing
20,
2011),
(July
Libya,
GLOBALRESEARCH
War Against
an Illegal
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-role-of-the-un-security-council-in-unleashing-anillegal-war-against-libya (wondering whether a "more complex process" than a single
letter caused the decision to approve Resolution 1970). Shaigham's letter has been
credited as decisive in the unanimous passage of the Resolution. See Irwin Cotler &
Jared Genser, Op-Ed., Libya and the Responsibility To Protect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01iht-edcotler01.html (describing the
resolution and noting that it was unanimous).
U.N. Security Council, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498
232.
(Mar. 17, 2011).

233.

Id.

234.
235.
236.

Id. at 8-9.
Lederer, supranote 205.
Lederer, supranote 223.
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As the processes leading to Resolutions 1970 and 1973 show,
Security Council members recognized that the Qaddafi government
controlled Libya 2 3 7-or by the time of Resolution 1973, substantial
parts of Libya-but they also recognized that Qaddafi was not the
legitimate representative of the people.23 8 This exemplifies an
important principle of a substance-infused concept of sovereignty in
the people: the government may be treated as the legitimate
representative of the people only if it maintains domestic legitimacy.
If the people do not authorize the ruler to lead the country, the ruler
may be able to control the country, but cannot be treated as the true
representative of the sovereign entitled to sovereign rights.
3.

Failure to Fulfill Duties

In addition to Qaddafi's express loss of legitimacy, the
international community based its decision to intervene in Libya's
domestic affairs on Qaddafi's failure to refrain from crimes against
humanity in violation of his duties under the doctrine of
responsibility to protect.2 39 In the run-up to Resolution 1970, Qaddafi
fired upon unarmed protestors and called upon his loyalists to
slaughter his opposition. In Resolution 1970, the Security Council
specifically noted "the gross and systematic violation of human rights,
including the repression of peaceful demonstrators . . . the deaths of

civilians, and ... the incitement to hostility and violence against the
civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan
government" 24 0 that "may amount to crimes against humanity."241
The Security Council then imposed an arms embargo, targeted the
Qaddafi leadership with sanctions, and referred them to the ICC for
an investigation into crimes against humanity.
When Resolution 1970 failed to achieve its goal of protecting the
people and it appeared that Qaddafi might succeed at decimating the
rebel forces, the international community revisited its options for
protecting the people and their sovereignty. 242 Resolution 1973
condemned Libya for "the gross and systematic violation of human

237.
Security Council members described Qaddafi's government as the "Libyan
Government," "Libyan authorities," the "regime," and the "leadership." U.N. Security
Council, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg., supranote 212, at 3-4.
238.
Id.
239.
The legal basis for Resolution 1970 was the doctrine of responsibility to
protect , along with the Security Council's Chapter VII powers under the UN Charter.
See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 212 ("Recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to
protect its population .... ). As described in Part III.C, responsibility to protect places
a duty on every state to "protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity." G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 57, at 1 138-139.
240.
S.C. Res. 1970, supranote 212.
241.
Id.
242.
See supra Part III.E.3.
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rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances,
torture and summary executions" that possibly constituted crimes
against humanity. Reflecting the escalation of Qaddafi's violence
against civilians, the international community stripped the Libyan
leadership of the last vestiges of its sovereign rights and permitted
military action on behalf of the civilian population. 243
The Security Council's actions in the processes of adopting
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 effectively adopted the approach
advocated here to justify international intervention. It recognized
that control over territory could not be equated with legitimacy when
it treated the Libyan diplomatic mission as the representative of the
people even after it defected from the Qaddafi regime that still
controlled Libya's territory. It denied the government international
legitimacy on the basis that it lacked domestic legitimacy. By basing
international intervention on the responsibility to protect, the
Security Council applied the concept that a government owes its
citizens duties that, if unfulfilled, strip the government of the
sovereign right to be free from international intervention in its
domestic affairs. The international response to Qaddafi in the end
days of the Libyan dictatorship illustrates both the logic of
sovereignty in the people and how effective it can be when infused
with substance.

IV. THE PEOPLE

Part IV asks two important questions likely to raise theoretical
and practical concerns about the implementation of a substanceinfused concept of sovereignty in the people: (1) who are the people;
and (2) can democracies, which presumably represent the people,
violate sovereignty in the people? These two questions reflect
concerns regarding tyranny of the majority and parse out the
differences in types of democracy. They reflect the importance of a
nuanced approach to understanding the will and common good of the
people, as well as what constitutes appropriate representation of the
people. Part IV.A examines the first question, concluding that
minority groups must be accounted for within the phrase the people.
Part IV.B tackles whether and how democracies lose sovereign
entitlements, relying on examples from Afghanistan, India, Sri
Lanka, and France to illustrate its points.

243.

S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 221,

4.
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A. Who Are the People?
So far, the description of the meaning of sovereignty in the
people has assumed a unified voice for the people and that the
individuals who comprise the people share a will and vision of the
common good. In many countries, unity is little more than an
illusion-thus, the seemingly common outbreak of violence and civil
war. 244 This reality raises the issues of who constitutes the people
and how should their diverse interests be reconciled to achieve
sovereignty in the people?
Beginning with the first issue, the people are individuals in the
aggregate. These individuals typically form groups based on
perceptions of common needs and interests and on identity factors
such as race, culture, language, ties to a territory, ethnicity, and
religion, among other characteristics. 245 How individuals choose to
identify themselves typically represents societal divisions and is
complicated by overlapping identities and socioeconomic and other
factors that create differing needs and interests within the group.
Any cluster of individuals can define itself as a group deserving of a
voice as part of the people.24 6 Majority groups typically claim to
represent the will and common good of the whole of the political
community, while minority groups demand a voice in that
determination. This contestation often simply perpetuates the need to
identify oneself as part of a group.
Under classical democratic theory and in line with Rousseau, the
will of the people is expressed through elections in which the majority
determines the outcome and the elected government determines how
to achieve the common good. 247 Majority rule was adopted as a
"political solution" to the difficulty of implementing democracy. 24 8 It
is expected to reflect the interests of a "fluid" majority; who
constitutes the majority changes with the issues, so no set of
individuals or groups are consistently excluded from decision

See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 11, at 81 (explaining why claims for self244.
determination by different groups in the same country frequently come into conflict
with one another).
See, e.g., Daniele Archibugi, The Self-determination of Peoples, 10
245.
CONSTELLATIONS 488, 491 (2003) (noting that "nothing can stop" any community which
recognizes itself in a given identity from defining itself according to that identity).
See .id. (explaining that a people will attempt to define itself along
246.
language, religion, race, and shared faith even though these methods may fail to
provide solid methods for defining the boundaries of that people).
See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 111, at 1332 (describing the clashing
247.
interests of the individual and the common good).
Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in InternationalLaw and the Demise
248.
of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 636-37 (2003).
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making. 249 Experience shows, however, that majority rule can lead to
tyranny of the majority-or "the majority's ability to abuse its
authority without compromise"-making this classical approach to
determining the will and common good of the people inappropriate.2 5 0
To ensure that the will of the people truly represents all of the
people, minority groups need to be given the opportunity for fair and
able
to elect
effective representation. 251 They must be
representatives, and their needs and concerns must inform the vision
of a common good rather than simply being overridden by the
majority. Failure to account for minority-group needs and interests is
a risk factor for armed conflict: "When minorities are denied a say in
political affairs, conflict often results because a political voice is the
key to the enjoyment of all other rights." 252 It is also a risk factor for
mass atrocities such as genocide. 253 Events in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and
Rwanda, among others, illustrate this point. 254 Recognition of the
importance of minority representation thus comports with the

249.
Id. at 643-44 (quoting LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 3 (1995)).

250.
See, e.g., WEINERT, supra note 118, at 61, 63 ("Governments may, under the
guise of popular majority vote, deprive minorities of essential political rights and civil
liberties.").
251.
This answer begs the question of who constitutes the people to the extent
that it does not explain which minority groups deserve representation. Factors such as
size of the group and the stability and sustainability of the shared identity are likely to
play into the determination, along with the context of the group's treatment within the
state. Minority Rights Group International claims that the internationally accepted
definition of minority is "straightforward": "[I]t is a group of people who believe they
have a common identity, based on culture/ethnicity, language or religion, which is
different from that of a majority group around them." CLIVE BALDWIN, CHRIS CHAPMAN
& ZOE GRAY, MINORITY RIGHTS: THE KEY TO CONFLICT PREVENTION 4 (2007). The

Vienna Commission, which was responsible for producing a draft convention for the
protection of minorities for the European Union, suggested the following definition of
minority: "A group which is smaller in number than the rest of the
population ... whose members, although nationals of that State, have ethnical,
religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are
guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language." Lyra
Porras Garzon, Group Rights us. Individual Rights?, ISIS INT'L (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=281&Itemid
=135 (citing Council of Eur., Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of
Minorities, 3d Sess., Doc. No. 7228 (Jan. 31, 1995)).
252.
Baldwin, Chapman & Gray, supranote 251, at 12.
253.

See OFFICE OF THE UN SPECIAL ADVISOR ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE,

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 1-2 (2009) (including a record of discrimination and other
human rights violations committed against a group under factors to be analyzed to
determine whether there may be a risk of genocide in a given situation).
254.
See, e.g., KARL CORDELL & STEFAN WOLFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES

194 (2009) (referencing a "proliferation of ethnic

conflict since the end of the Cold War"). Minority Rights Group International found
that 71 percent of ongoing conflicts had "an ethnic dimension," suggesting that
"[w]here minority rights go consistently ignored, a descent into conflict is always a
risk." Conflict, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT'L, www.minorityrights.org/6857/thematicfocus/conflict.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
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underlying purpose of the concept of sovereignty: to organize domestic
affairs so as to protect the security and common good of the political
community. Meaningful representation demands the removal of any
barrier to effective participation of all groups in governance and an
electoral system and human rights conditions that promote a more
inclusive determination of the will of the people and their common
good.
This ideal of representative government is complicated when
minority groups refuse the assimilation inherent in the process. Some
groups argue that there is no one people within their state's
territorial boundaries but multiple peoples who have the right to be
governed according to their differing wills. 2 55 These groups generally
show less concern with inclusion in the development of a unified will
and vision of the common good and more interest in the survival of
their
particular
linguistic, cultural,
religious,
or
ethnic
characteristics. 256 They typically demand a state design that permits
limited self-rule and allows for equal representation with the
majority. 257 Examples of such designs range from accommodation for
group rights through legal pluralism and protection of their ethnic,
cultural, or religious institutions to territorial autonomy through
devolution of power, federalism, and semi-autonomous zones. These
types of power-sharing arrangements may forestall or wholly prevent
internal conflict, 258 although some believe that the accommodations
increase societal divisions, preventing the healthy development of a
national identity.25 9 The claims need to be addressed in order for a
government to retain legitimacy.

255.
See Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International
Law?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 338 (2002) (discussing the theory that sovereignty is
based on the consent of the governed, and suggesting that minority groups within a
state should have their own ability to withhold this consent).
256.
See Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 453, 457 (2003) (describing the different degrees of self-determination, with
one degree being the claim of right by indigenous groups within the democracy to use
their own languages and engage in their own cultural practices).
See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 11, at 34 (hypothesizing about possible
257.
outcomes after the devolution of large central government); Nettesheim, supra note
125, at 367 (noting how the idea of representative holders of public office representing
the common good "seems to be receding").
258.
See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era:A
New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 752 (1995) (reviewing YVES BEIGBEDER,
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS:
SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994)) (explaining how

internal self-determination can ameliorate tensions between majority and minority
groups through the creation of "inclusive political processes" that allow entire
populations to chart their own destinies).
259.
E.g., Baldwin, Chapman & Gray, supra note 251, at 2 ("Too often,
separating groups along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines has been seen as a way of
upholding minority rights and keeping peace between groups. While such solutions
might be an easy option in the aftermath of conflicts, long term these divisions can
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These alternatives to majority rule may not be accepted by the
majority or may not satisfy the demands of a minority group, which
leads to the next important question: what if one group in a society is
demanding secession as part of its right to self-determination? In
theory, a healthy, functioning democracy that represents all groups in
society and that does not enforce the will of the majority alone should
weaken the desire for a separate state. Consistent with this theory,
the UN General Assembly has adopted declarations maintaining a
state's right to territorial integrity only when the government is truly
representative and provides real equality for minority groups; 260 the
stronger the violation of the minority group's rights, the stronger its
claim for secession. 26 1 The phrase minority group in this context is
intended to refer to an ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious group,
rather than any self-proclaimed minority group. 262 The international
community of states is extremely reluctant to consider secession as an
option for ensuring self-determination for fear that it will encourage
other groups to make similar demands. The secession discussion is
tangential to the topic of this Article, as secessionists demand a new
state with a new political community, rather than representation
within the people for purposes of sovereignty in an existing state.
One important concern for the application of this theory of
sovereignty is whether fringe members of minority groups will be able
hijack the concept of sovereignty to undermine the democratic
government. For example, a South African farmer recently
complained to the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide
that the South African government was conducting genocide against
its Afrikaner population. 263 The complaint alleges that 36,500 white
farmers have been murdered since 1990, while official statistics place
that number at 3,020.264 The farmer sought a UN investigation of his

entrench old hatreds and wounds."); Dr. Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building
and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663, 672-74 (2006) (noting that there
remains "much uncertainty" surrounding the impact of different governance choices in
post-conflict environments).
Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, 'ConstructiveAmbiguity'or Internal
260.
Self-Determination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast
Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345, 1349-50 (1999); Raday, supra note 245, at

456.
261.
Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 260, at 1349-50; see also Raday, supra note
245, at 456 (describing the right of self-determination as a right "either of previously
colonized peoples or of peoples tied by common ethnic, religious, or linguistic bonds in a
State whose government fails to represent them").
262.
Makau Mutua, The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable
Constitution, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006) (defining minority groups as small,
nondominant groups in a state that "possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population").
263.
Emma Hurd, White Farmer Accuses South Africa of Genocide, SKY NEWS
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://news.sky.com/story/801348/white-farmer-accuses-south-africa-ofgenocide.
264.
Id.
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claim, which raises sovereign rights issues. 265 Whether the United
Nations can conduct an international investigation into South Africa
depends on whether it meets the test for losing sovereignty. Does it
retain legitimacy, even among the Afrikaner population? Is the
government fulfilling its duties to the people? If there are human
rights violations, which the number of deaths of white farmers
suggests, is the government responsible through behavior that would
appear to be encouraging it? Is there accountability for these crimes?
This assessment will weed out fringe claims, such as to genocide, 266
but could potentially locate a real source of concern for the
community: whether white farmers face a disproportionate risk for
political violence.
This discussion about who constitutes the people and how their
will and common good are determined, while simplistic, is important
for understanding the contours of sovereignty in the people. To
prevent tyranny of the majority, which risks conflict and mass
atrocities, minority groups must be represented in the formation of
the will and common good of the people. Thus, the government must
retain legitimacy among and fulfill its duties to all the people to
benefit from sovereign rights.
B. Can a Democratic Government Lose Its Sovereign Rights?
One of the more contentious assertions of this Article is that a
democratic government can lose sovereign rights just as a
dictatorship can. Because, by definition, people living in democracies
choose their representatives and can change them through elections,
the international community is more likely to be reluctant to
intervene in the domestic affairs of democracies. Yet, as the
remainder of this subpart shows, procedural democracies and even
liberal democracies can fail to meet the duties necessary to retain full
sovereign rights.

265.
Jenni O'Grady, Govt Says Genocide Claims 'Ludicrous,'1MAIL & GUARDIAN
(Aug. 24, 2010), http://mg.co.zalarticle/2010-08-24-govt-says-genocide-claims-ludicrous.
Genocide has a very specific legal meaning. It is defined as
266.
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art 2., Dec. 9,
1949, Sen. Exec. Doc. 0, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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Illiberal Democracies

An illiberal democracy is a democracy by procedure only; the
people elect the government, but they have little influence on
government policy. 26 7 The lack of influence means the government
does not accord the full human rights necessary to achieve
substantive democracy. 268 The failure to protect and promote full
human rights is likely to violate both the legitimacy and duties
requirements for the exercise of sovereign rights. By themselves, free
and fair elections do not insulate governments from a loss of
sovereign rights, although certainly they are a factor in the test for
legitimacy and whether the government is fulfilling its duties to the
people.
Sri Lanka provides an example of a procedural democracy in
which the government, once elected, regularly violates the rights of
its people. 2 69 The government stands accused of extrajudicial killings,
particularly of political opposition members, human rights activists,
and journalists. For example, the Committee to Protect Journalists
ranks Sri Lanka fourth of the countries with the world's worst record
for killing journalists with impunity;270 this impunity leads the Sri
Lankan media to censor itself.27 ' The Sri Lankan government also is
notorious for torturing persons accused of crimes. 272 The UN
Committee Against Torture, in particular, expressed concern with the
practice "where the victims were allegedly randomly selected by
police to be arrested and detained for what appears to be an
unsubstantiated charge and subsequently subjected to torture or ill-

See d'Aspremont, supra note 111, at 913 (describing an illiberal democracy
267.
as "a democratically elected government exercising its power in violation of the
substantive elements of democracy").
See id. (including violation of the substantive elements of democracy within
268.
the umbrella of "blatant violations of human rights"); supra Part III.B.1 (describing
substantive democracy).
269.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SRI LANKA (2011)
for a description of problems in presidential and parliamentary elections that affected
their fairness.
270.
COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (2011); see
also The Price of Truth: For Reporters, a Moment of Fear, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2009
(describing a twenty-year sentence on terrorism charges for a journalist critical of army
behavior toward Tamils in the North).
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 269, at 16.
271.
See Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations, 47th Sess., Oct. 31272.
6, U.N. Doc. CAT/CILKA/CO/3-4 (Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter
Nov. 25, 2011,
Concluding Observations] ("[T]he committee remains seriously concerned about the
continued and consistent allegations of widespread use of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of suspects in police custody, especially to extract
confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings."); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
supra note 269, at 6-7 (discussing reports of torture).
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treatment to obtain a confession for those charges."273 The
government has been blamed for enforced disappearances, including
of human rights activists and journalists; 274 approximately 475
disappearances were reported to the UN Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances between 2006 and 2010.275 As with
the murder of journalists, these human rights violations are
committed with full impunity, as soldiers and government officials go
unpunished despite evidence showing their participation or
complicity in these crimes. 2 76
In the wake of a military win in a nearly three-decades-long civil
war between the majority-Sinhala government and the Liberation
Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which claimed to represent the
minority Tamil population,2 77 Tamils2 78 complain of serious security

See Concluding Observations, supra note 272, 11 (expressing concern over
273.
several reports of individuals being detained on unsubstantiated charges and tortured
to obtain confessions).
Rep. of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
274.
Lanka, 63 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Expert Panel Report] ("Between 2006 and the
end of the war, 66 humanitarian workers were either disappeared or killed.").
Concluding Observations, supranote 272, 9.
275.
See, e.g., Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, T 37 (discussing an
276.
environment of impunity that "created[d] an enabling environment for human rights
violations"); Sri Lanka: No Justice in Massacre ofAid Workers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug.
http://www.hrw.org/news/20 11/08/03/sri-lanka-no-justice-massacre-aid2011),
3,
workers (relating the case of seventeen aid workers likely killed by government
security forces to an overarching "lack of will to prosecute soldiers and police for rights
abuses"). In its Concluding Observations, the UN Committee Against Torture reported:
The Committee expresses its concern at reports that human rights
defenders, defence lawyers and other civil society actors, including political
activists, trade unionists and independent media journalists have been singled
out as targets of intimidation, harassment, including death threats and
physical attacks and politically motivated charges. It regrets that, in many
cases, those allegedly responsible for acts of intimidation and reprisal appear to
enjoy impunity.
13; see also id. T 18 (describing the
Concluding Observations, supra note 272,
Committee's concern with the "prevailing climate of impunity").
277.

See INT'L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REP. No. 209, RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA:

HARDER THAN EVER 3, 11 (2011) (discussing the decades-long war and stating that
many Tamils saw the LTTE as the only organization standing up for Tamil interests
against the majority-Sinhalese government). The New York Times describes the LTTE
as "a group that took up arms to defend the Tamil minority from government
discrimination but eventually became a ruthless insurgency best known for its use of
child soldiers and suicide bombers." Sri Lanka, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/srilankaindex.html (last updated Nov.
14, 2012).
It is important to note two categories of Tamils in Sri Lanka to avoid
278.
confusion. The Tamil population that is the subject of the conflict in the north and east
of Sri Lanka has been living in Sri Lanka for thousands of years. INT'L CRISIS GRP.,
supra note 277, at 3. They are to be contrasted with Tamils of Indian origin brought to
Sri Lanka by the British to work in tea plantations, who, while marginalized, did not
participate in the decades-long conflict. Id. at 3, 5.
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fears. 279 In particular, they express concern with the government's
mission to root out all possible LTTE supporters. 28 0 While most of the
300,000 Tamils initially detained in internationally funded
"internment" camps have been released for resettlement, 28 1 it is
believed that up to 3,000 Tamils are being detained incommunicado
for "rehabilitation" in undisclosed facilities.282
Reportedly, the Sri Lankan military has taken over 7,000 of the
18,800 square kilometers of land occupied by Tamils in Sri Lanka's
Northern Province, and there is one soldier for every ten inhabitants
in Jaffna, its provincial capital. 283 The militarization is intended to
assert government control and prevent the organization of Tamil
opposition. 284 Many Tamils also fear that their land is being taken as
part of a government-sponsored "Sinhalisation" process, which

The answer to the question of how much sovereignty the Sri Lankan
279.
government should lose or should have lost as a result of human rights abuses depends
on the time period under consideration. The three most relevant periods for analysis
are: the civil-war period, the immediate post-war period while the majority of the
Tamil population was interned, and the present. Each period presents different
government human rights abuses, making the analysis complicated but rich. The
discussion here is focused solely on the current human rights picture, while the
remaining two periods will be discussed further below.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 269, at 1 ("In an effort to prevent any
280.
violent separatist resurgence, the government continued to search for and detain
persons it suspected of being LTTE sympathizers or operatives.").
While the Sri Lankan government denies that these Tamils were being
281.
interned, the Tamil refugees were not free to leave the camps but needed permission
from the government. See Ravi Nessman, Nobody In or Out: Sri Lanka laterms Tamil
War Refugees with Help of Foreign Aid, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 18, 2009) (stating that
the refugees are held in the camps until the government has decided that they can
return to certain areas). The government initially intended to house Tamils in these
camps, which they named "welfare villages," for up to three years. Ravi Nessman, Sri
Lanka Plans To House War Refugees for 3 Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlywires/2009Feb 111/0,4675,ASSriLankaCamps,
0O.html. In the areas in which Tamils have been permitted to return, the government
has not yet been able to replace the infrastructure or basic services destroyed during
the war, which makes living conditions difficult at best. See INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra
note 277, at 14 (stating that those in one area "are living in makeshift shelters, with
little in the way of jobs, other livelihood opportunities or access to basic infrastructure,"
and that those in another area suffer from "food insecurity and poverty").
INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 277, at 17.
282.
M.A. Sumanthiran, Situation in North-Eastern Sri Lanka: A Series of
283.
Serious Concerns 1 2.1 (Oct. 21, 2011), available at dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/2759;
see also BHAVANI FONSEKA & MIRAK RAHEEM, CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTS., LAND IN THE
NORTHERN PROVINCE: POST-WAR POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICES 15 (2011) (stating
that "a significant number of properties still remain under military occupation" in the
North). The government contests how much land has been claimed by the military;
however, there are reasons to question its estimations. See id. at 151-52 (stating that
"there is a reluctance to acknowledge the full scope of the restrictions," and giving the
example that in the month of September 2011, the Navy acquired more than twice as
many properties as the government's report stated the Navy occupied).
See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 277, at 12-14 (describing the
284.
government's efforts to disenfranchise the Tamils, including the government's control
of resettlement areas).

154

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:97

appears to be an attempt to reduce the concentration of Tamils in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces by giving land to the Sinhalese
majority. 28 5 The government further has linked with Tamil
paramilitary groups in the Eastern Province who violently control the
predominantly Tamil population there. These paramilitary groups
regularly engage in "extrajudicial killings, abductions, extortion,
prostitution and child trafficking." 286 They are permitted full
impunity in exchange for loyalty to the government. 28 7 The human
rights picture for Tamils in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, thus, is
bleak. In fact, so bad are the government abuses that the United
Kingdom ranks Sri Lanka as "amongst those [twenty-six countries]
where we have the most serious wide-ranging human rights
concerns."2 88
In order for the Sri Lankan government to retain its sovereign
rights-in particular, the right to be free from foreign interventionit must be the legitimate representative of and fulfill its mandatory
duties to the people. There is little doubt that the government retains
at least some domestic legitimacy. 289 It was democratically elected by
the majority of the population and receives much support from the
Sinhalese population for how it conducted the war against the
LTTE. 290 To claim it has full domestic legitimacy within the majority
of the population, however, is highly problematic given the extent to
which the government violates the rights of anyone who dissents from
or opposes its regime.

285.
FONSEKA & RAHEEM, supranote 283, at 139-40.
286.
INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 277, at 4; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra
note 269, at 3 (stating that individuals suspected of involvement in paramilitary
groups, including breakaway LTTE eastern commanders, killed and assaulted
civilians).
287.
INT'L CRISIS GRP., supranote 277, at 20.
288.
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE
2010 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE REPORT 119 (2010) (U.K.), available at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm80/801 7/8017.pdf.
289.
The Centre for Policy Alternatives in Sri Lanka conducted a poll to
determine the population's thoughts on democracy in Sri Lanka. It found that 58.8
percent of Sri Lankans feel that current President Mahinda Rajapaksa has run a more
democratic country that his predecessors. When broken down by social groups, 69.9
percent of Sinhalese polled supported this view compared to 23.6 percent of Tamil
respondents and 13.1 percent of "Up country Tamils," meaning Tamils of Indian origin
who live in nonconflict regions of Sri Lanka, and 21.9 percent of Muslims, showing that
the poll numbers reflect the majority view. CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTs., SURVEY ON
DEMOCRACY IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA 25 (2011). Rajapaksa has an 82.6 percent
approval rating among Sinhalese polled but only a 15.9 percent approval rating among
Tamils. See id. at 25-26 (reporting 82.6 percent in Southern Province, 15.9 percent in
Northern Province). Furthermore, while 50 percent of Sinhala respondents consider
themselves completely free to express political opinions, only 15.8 percent of Tamils,
38.8 percent of Up-country Tamils, and 16.9 percent of Muslims agreed. Id. at 33 graph
6.1.
290.
Summary to BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31707, SRI
LANKA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS (2011).
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More complex is the determination of whether the Tamil
population views the government as legitimate. The civil war ended
in 2009 with a decisive military victory during which it appears the
government (and the LTTE) committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity.2 9' The very existence of a civil war negates the
domestic legitimacy of the government, at least with respect to the
rebel group, a point considered more fully below. The fact that the
government crushed the LTTE insurgents does not return domestic
legitimacy to it. Rather, how the government treats the Tamil
population now, whether the government is currently addressing
Tamil needs and concerns, and whether there has been any
accountability for any crimes committed by the government during
the course of the war and after determine its domestic legitimacy.
The very brief summary above shows that Sri Lankan Tamils
suffer regular violations of the freedom of association, the right to
equality, and the right to be protected against arbitrary detention,
along with heightened security fears, which likely prevents the Sri
Lankan government from regaining legitimacy within this
community. A recent poll shows that the majority of Tamils living in
former conflict areas feel that the government has done little or
nothing to address the root causes of the conflict, 292 which suggests
that the government is not addressing the needs and concerns of the
Tamil population. Additionally, the International Crisis Group
reports that "most of the government's policies have increased ethnic

291.
While these allegations were against both sides, the question of sovereign
rights relates solely to government behavior. For this reason, this Article considers
only the violations of duties to the people by the government. See Executive Summary
to Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at ii (discussing the report's framework to
"assess[] the domestic policy, measures and institutions, which are relevant to the
approach to accountability taken by the Government of Sri Lanka"). The Panel also
accuses the LTTE of these crimes; however, the LTTE's behavior is not a consideration
in determining the sovereign rights of the government.
292.
See CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTS., supra note 289, at 39 graph 7.3 (reporting
32.3 percent "Has Done Little," 30.8 percent "Has done a little, but not enough"). At the
same time, however, just over half the Tamil population shows some trust in the
government. See id. at 42-43 tbl.8.1 (indicating over 50 percent of Tamils reported
"some trust" in the centrallnational government, provincial government, and local
government). The United Nations' Secretary-General's Panel of Experts described how
"triumphalism on the part of the Government, expressed through its discourse on
having developed the means and will to defeat 'terrorism"' has effectively "end[ed]
Tamil aspirations for political autonomy and recognition." Executive Summary to
Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at vi. The International Crisis Group has also
reported:
A central pillar of the government's strategy since 2005 has been to
recast the civil war as another front in the global "war on terror" and deny its
ethno-political context. . . . [I]t has been an excuse for the government to reject
the need for any meaningful power sharing or state reforms designed to
address the political marginalisation of minorities.
INT'L CRISIs GRP., supranote 277, at 11.
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polarisation between and within groups and closed space for
reform." 293 As to the last consideration-accountability for crimes
against humanity and war crimes-the UN-sponsored Panel of
Experts reported that the Sri Lankan government's "notion of
accountability" does not accord with international standardS294 and
that currently Sri Lanka lacks "an environment conducive to
accountability." 295 Each of these factors undermines nearly any claim
to legitimacy of the government among the Tamil population.
There is also little doubt that the Sri Lankan government is
running afoul of its duties to the people and that the problems are
systemic and result in severe harm. There are three separate targets
of human rights violations: (1) political dissenters, (2) minority
groups, 296 and (3) purported criminals. Given that Sri Lanka retains
the choice in leadership, the government can claim its sovereign
rights except as applied to these three areas.
The extent of the loss of sovereign entitlements in these areas
then depends on the severity of harm that results from the human
rights violations. Looked at separately, each type of human rights
violation likely would trigger a different degree of loss of sovereign
rights. For example, violation of the right of a criminally accused to
be free from torture would likely justify international criticism but
not sanctions or conditions on international relations because of the
likely overly harsh effects of either action. The efforts to censor
political opposition by killing, disappearing, torturing, and detaining
human rights activists and journalists would likely weigh more
heavily in a proportionality test, which would permit greater
intervention. There is little doubt that conditions on international
relations would be appropriate here. The weight of harm increases
enormously when looking at the Tamil population, as the government
not only lacks legitimacy among this population but also abuses the
rights of Tamils, sowing seeds of discord. Again, this should escalate
the level of permissible intervention. Weighing together the harm to
all three targets of rights violations, nearly any intervention short of
military intervention likely could be justified, including criminal
prosecution of the Sri Lankan leadership under universal
jurisdiction.2 9 7 Military intervention surely would cause more harm

293.
INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 277, at 10.
294.
Executive Summary to Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at iv.
295.
Id. at vi.
296.
It is important to note that Sri Lanka has a significant Muslim and Indian
Tamil minority that also suffers regularly from discrimination. See INT'L CRISIS GRP.,
supra note 277, at 3, 5-6, 8-10 (discussing discrimination of the Up-country (Indian)
Tamils and the Muslims).
297.
Canada has threatened to cut aid to Sri Lanka as a result of this lack of
accountability. Lee Berthiaume, Losing Canadian Aid Big Loss but Survivable: Sri
Lankan Minister, GLOBAL PEACE SUPPORT GRP. UK (Nov. 5, 2011, 1:27 AM),
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than good to Sri Lankans already suffering from the effects of decades
of war.
Illustrating how sovereignty in the people justifies current
international relations rather than alters it, the European Union
recently applied a similar analysis to the one advocated here when
deciding to remove Sri Lanka from the list of countries that were
rewarded trade concessions for increased human rights protections
under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP+) scheme.2 98 The
decision to revoke these concessions was based on a report
commissioned by the European Union that found "[w]idespread police
torture, abductions of journalists, politicised courts . . . uninvestigated
disappearances," impunity, and arbitrary detention.29 9 Prior to the
revocation of GSP+, the European Union gave Sri Lanka the
opportunity to commit to correcting the fifteen human rights and
governance issues identified as violations of Sri Lanka's human
rights commitments.3 0 0 The Sri Lankan government characterized
the EU action as a breach of Sri Lanka's sovereign right to be free
from interference in domestic concerns when rejecting the EU
conditions for GSP+. 3 0 Sri Lanka's Central Bank Governor Ajith

http://www.globalpeacesupport.com/2011/1 1/losing-canadian-aid-big-loss-butsurvivable-sri-lankan-minister/.
298.
EU Withdraws Sri Lanka's Special Trade Status, CNN (July 6, 2010, 5:58
AM). Developing countries may be included in the GSP+ program if they can show a
commitment to human rights and good governance.
299.
Sri Lanka and the EU: Losing Touch with Old Friends, ECONOMIST, Sept.
3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14384352.
300.
Press Release, European Comm'n, EU Regrets Silence of Sri Lanka
Regarding Preferential Import Regime, IP/10/888 (July 5, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-10-888_en.htm#PR-metaPressRelease-bottom.
The conditions specifically target violations of the ICCPR, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with a particular focus on
conditions that lead to arbitrary detention and torture. Dilini Perera, Sri Lanka
Savaged, SUNDAY LEADER (June 27, 2010), http://www.thesundayleader.1k/2010/
06/27/sri-lanka-savaged/.
301.
Perera, supra note 300. Sri Lanka also invoked sovereignty to reject
international calls for an independent investigation into war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Sri Lanka has vociferously rejected these demands, claiming that as a
sovereign country responding to wholly domestic "terrorism," it is entitled to protection
from international interference in its sovereign affairs. See Nab Those Aiding and
Abetting LTTE-Eksath Lanka Maha Sabha, SUNDAY OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2011),
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2011/11/06/new30.asp (quoting an official's statement
that Sri Lanka and other small countries should "oppose this kind of arrogant
meddling in their internal affairs," and arguing that Western countries are using
human rights as an excuse for pursuing their own interests); Sri Lanka Will Not Allow
Foreign Interferences To Solve Country's Problems, COLOMBOPAGE (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:26
(reporting
PM), http://www.colombopage.com/archive_11B/Decl4_1323874615CH.php
on statements made by Sri Lanka's External Affairs Minster that "Sri Lanka as a
sovereign state will not allow any international mechanisms to interfere in the
country's internal issues and cannot be pressured to bow down to any foreign
interventions"). This position, unfortunately, has been supported by China, who many
fear will become increasingly more influential in Sri Lanka if Western nations
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Nivard Cabraal, for example, explained that "the government had no
intention of giving in to some of the demands made by the EU
because it was essential to safeguard Sri Lanka's sovereignty." 302 The
European Union ignored Sri Lanka's vociferous calls to accord it
sovereign rights when it formally revoked GSP+.
Another type of illiberal democracy arises from a constitution,
which is considered an expression of the social contract that
determines the common good based on a particular set of religious or
cultural values.3 03 One issue these democracies raise is what happens
if the people predetermine a vision of the common good that binds
them indefinitely without consideration of whether that vision might
change? For example, Afghanistan adopted a constitution that not
only requires the application of aspects of shari'a law within the
country, 304 but also prohibits amendments to provisions protecting
Islam and its role in governance.3 05 The constitution prescribes that
the common good must be determined by the Islamic vision of the
"good life," rather than maintaining a neutral view that leaves open a
wider range of choices for determining the content of the common
good. The limitation on the constitutional amendments means that in
the future, at least under this constitution, the people cannot choose
to remove religion from governance. While Afghans exercised their
will by adopting the restrictive constitutional provision, they have
limited the future exercise of self-determination and their choices for
what constitutes the common good.
The question then becomes whether the people can choose to
forgo their current and future freedom to determine the common

implement sanctions or conditions on international relations to pressure the
government to submit to an independent investigation of the war. See China Backs
Lanka over Humanitarian Crimes Probe, ZEENEWS.COM (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asialchina-backs-lanka-over-humanitariancrimes-probe_730400.html (reporting that China has backed Sri Lanka's claims to
independence and sovereignty). Again, as conceived of here, sovereignty lies with the
people, not the government, which means if it is to have any meaning, the government
cannot hide behind the sovereignty shield.
302.
Lanka Won't Barter Sovereignty for GSP+: Cabraal,DAILY MIRROR, Feb.
18, 2010, http://www.tisrilanka.org/?p=3677#.
See generally Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism,37 CONN. L.
303.
REV. 891, 898 (2005) (arguing that a constitution should secure liberty for others);
Graham Walker, The Mixed ConstitutionAfter Liberalism, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 311, 315-316 (1996) (describing systems that "assert that the state authority should
openly prefer some substantive vision of the best kind life" and can be based on
religion).
304.
See Hallie Ludsin, Relational Rights Masquerading as Individual Rights,
15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 195, 208-09 (2008) (noting that religious personalstatus law will likely be applied to all Afghans, based on three provisions of the
constitution).
305.
QANfJN-I ISASI-I AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION] art. 149 ("The principles of
adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as well as Islamic Republicanism
shall not be amended.").
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good. Phrased differently, it leads to the question: what happens if
the will of the people conflicts with their best interests? Can the
people lose their sovereignty for making choices for the present that
may restrict their ability to act according to their will in the future?
As Rousseau described, "Our will is always for our own good, but we
do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is
often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is
bad."30 6 Bearing this point in mind, the people never lose their
sovereignty but, depending on the situation, the people may lose the
benefits or rights of sovereignty. In an expression of their will, the
people may make choices that are not in their best interests. Those
choices are protected as an act of the sovereign as long as the actions
do not violate their sovereign duties and the whole of the people views
those choices as legitimate. Just as a government cannot violate these
conditions for retaining its entitlement to claim sovereign rights,
neither can the people.
For illiberal democracies based on a preference for a religious or
cultural determination of the common good, the main question is
whether their governments can fulfill their duties to all members of
society and not just the majority. The concern in Afghanistan is
whether minority religious groups and secular individuals will be
able to exercise their rights or will be alienated from the state
because of the preference of Islam and role of shari'a law in
governance. 307 If those fears come to fruition, then the government,
even though it is acting according to the rule of law as defined by the
people, cannot claim its sovereign rights. As for the prohibition on
amendment of provisions pertaining to Islam, as long as the
constitution remains a valid expression of the will of all the people,
then the government acting on behalf of the people retains its
sovereign rights. If and when the people conclude that the
constitution no longer reflects their will and vision of the common
good, they must be free to change it, despite the expectation that the
constitution is permanent.
2.

Democracies in Conflict

This type of clash between the will of the people and their best
interests occurs not only in illiberal democracies but also generally in
conflict situations. During internal or external strife, the people often
are willing to trade their human rights for measures that promise

306.
Rousseau, supra note 101, at 25.
307.
See, e.g., Mir Hermatullah Sadat, The Implementation of Constitutional
Human Rights in Afghanistan, 11 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 48, 48-49 (2004) (noting that "[t]he
new Constitution incorporates the ideals of democracy, freedom, and individual rights
while maintaining a strong emphasis on Afghanistan's Islamic heritage" and that
"nothing in the Constitution prevents the implementation of Sharia, or Islamic law").
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more security.30 8 The test for whether conflict societies run afoul of
the legitimacy or duty requirements necessary for a government to
claim sovereign rights depends on which rights the people exchange
for security and whether certain groups within the people face human
rights violations as a result. For example, repressive legislation
permitting torture or curtailing nonderogable rights such as freedom
of religion is not permissible even when it reflects the will of the
people. Nor are restrictions on democratic rights, even if the majority
of the people agree to them. More common is the tendency for
government supporters to exchange the rights of dissenters, perceived
as agitators, for greater security. Once tensions boil over into armed
conflict, it is easy for government supporters to justify the nearly
total loss of rights of the group demanding change. In any of these
circumstances, the people lose some or all of their sovereign rights.
India provides an example of how an exchange of rights for
security can limit the people's entitlement to sovereign rights when
civil tensions run high. India's constitution expressly permits
preventive detention, or extrajudicial detention, in anticipation of a
threat against public order, but refuses detainees the due process
rights necessary to protect against arbitrary detention.3 09 As a
reminder, the right to be free from arbitrary detention is considered
customary international law and a duty the government is required
to meet to qualify for full sovereign rights.31 0 During the Constituent
Assembly, drafters removed a requirement that detainees be granted
due process rights from the draft constitution. They justified its
removal on the basis of post-partition violence following the creation
of Pakistan and a communist-led armed rebellion:
On occasions like this sympathies of most of us go out to the high
principles which in the past we proclaimed from housetops. But there
are other friends who occupy seats of authority and responsibility
throughout the country. They warn us that the aftermath of war and
partition has unchained forces which if allowed to gain upper-hand will
engulf the country in anarchy and ruin.. . . Many of us are not
convinced that dire results would necessarily follow the adoption of the
phrase "due process of law". But the difficulty is this, that even if we
were- [sic] to stand for our own convictions there is no scope far
31
experimenting in such matters. 1

Hallie Ludsin, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Palestinian
308.
ConstitutionalDraftingProcess, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 443, 482 (2005).
INDIA CONST. art. 22; see also id. sched. 7, list I, no. 9, sched. 7, list III, no.
309.
3 (permitting detention of persons considered a threat to public order, state and
national security, defense of India, foreign relations, and the supply of essential
services). Article 22 expressly denies detainees a right to a lawyer and mandatory
judicial review of the detention. Id. art. 22, §§ 1-2, 3(b).
310.
See supra notes 132-62 and accompanying text.
16,
1949),
of India-Volume IX (Sept.
311.
Constituent Assembly
(statement of B.M. Gupte,
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/Is/debates/vol9p36a.htm
Representative, Bombay).
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As a result of a permissive constitutional regime, India regularly
engages in arbitrary detention. The National Security Act, for
example, adopts a "subjective satisfaction" standard for determining
the necessity of preventive detention, which India's Supreme Court
has interpreted as restricting review of habeas corpus petitions to
whether the executive followed constitutional and statutory
procedure when ordering detention. 3 12 The UN Human Rights
Committee has expressly stated that "court review of the lawfulness
of detention . .. is not limited to mere formal compliance of the
detention with domestic law"; instead, a full review, including of the
substance, must be permitted.3 13
The National Security Act also permits the detention of anyone
considered a threat to public order. 314 The judiciary has interpreted
the term "public order" so broadly that nearly any ordinary crime can
be considered a threat to it,315 making arbitrary detention all too
easy. International law requires governments to apply a
proportionality test to ensure that the loss of rights inherent in
preventive detention is proportionate to the anticipated harm from
the threatened activity. India's judiciary, however, has been reticent
to challenge executive determinations of what constitutes public
order.3 16 As a result, India has preventively detained "muggers,
sexual harassers, robbers, bootleggers, blackmarketeers and
smugglers, among many others," without any consideration of
proportionality.3 1 7

312.
The only permissible substantive review is whether the detainee can show
that the detaining authority failed to apply its mind when issuing the order. If there
are no materials to support the order or no rational connection between those materials
and the expected harm, a court can revoke a detention order.
313.
Shafiq v. Australia, Views, Commc'n No. 1324/2004, 1 7.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004, (2006).
314.
National Security Act, 1980, No. 65 of 1980, INDIA CODE, art. 3(2).
315.
The National Security Act: Where Is the Proportionality?, HUM. RTS.
FEATURES, Feb. 11, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter Where is the Proportionality?],
http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF212.pdf
("[P]ersons
are held under
preventive detention regardless of the gravity of the crimes sought to be prevented or
the seriousness of their effects on society.").
316.
Kumar v. Delhi Administration (1982) 3 S.C.R. 707, 715 (India) ("Those
who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order
must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires.").
317.
Where is the Proportionality?,supra note 315, at 1-23; see also Thongam
(Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi v. District Magistrate, (2007) 4 G.L.T. 931,
4, 19 (India)
(upholding the detention order of person thought to be "extracting money" and
conducting "other illegal activity"); Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1998) 2 A.W.C.
925,
3, 13 (India) (upholding detention of a person accused of kidnapping for
ransom); Kumar, 3 S.C.R. at 717-18 (upholding preventive detention of a mugger);
Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) (India) Crim. L.J. 1413,
13, 20 (upholding
detention order for a dacoit (bandit)); UP Police Slap NSA Against Eve Teasers, CNNIBN (May 30, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/up-police-slap-nsa-againsteve-teasers/93733-3.html (describing how three men were detained for making
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While India's population all too readily accepted the exchange of
liberty rights for greater security, under the concept of sovereignty in
the people as espoused here, the international community may refuse
to fully grant India the sovereign right to be free from international
intervention in its domestic affairs on this issue. Arbitrary detention
is a systemic problem resulting in a severe deprivation of the
fundamental right to liberty. The restriction on substantive review of
detention orders coupled with weak jurisprudence deprives many
detainees of an effective remedy for a rights violation and prevents
accountability. Viewed in isolation, India's loss of sovereignty can
only be partial, and international intervention proportionate to and
targeted at the harm caused by preventive detention. In more
concrete terms, criticism is likely to be the only appropriate form of
intervention, as any other intervention would be likely to cause more
harm to Indians than a policy of arbitrary detention.
Civil wars raise a different type of sovereignty analysis, as the
issue is what happens when one group within the people violently
rejects the government supported by the majority? Sri Lanka
provides a particularly horrific example of this issue. Sri Lanka's
nearly thirty-year civil war with the LTTE ended in 2009 amidst
credible allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.3 18
The government stands accused of repeatedly and unilaterally
declaring no-fire zones, calling all Tamil civilians to take refuge
there, and then bombing them. 319 The military allegedly bombed
every hospital in the conflict area at least once.3 20 The government
reportedly underplayed the number of Tamil civilians trapped in the
conflict zone to allow it the greatest freedom to attack while avoiding
criticism for killing civilians.3 21 It also allegedly sought to deprive the
LTTE and the civilians under its control of food, medicine, and other
essential supplies. 322 Of the 290,000 to 330,000 civilians believed to
be in the conflict zone, there are credible estimates that up to 40,000
were killed in the last months of the war. 323 So bad were the

inappropriate sexual comments to a girl and how proceedings were initiated against
three youths for similar activity).
318.
See Executive Summary to Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at ii
(discussing report's framework to "assess[] the domestic policy, measures and
institutions, which are relevant to the approach to accountability taken by the
Government of Sri Lanka"). The Panel also accuses the LTTE of these crimes; however,
the LTTE's behavior is not a consideration in determining the sovereign rights of the
government. See note 291 for an explanation of why this Article focuses solely on
government conduct during the war.
319.
See Expert Panel Report, supra note 274,
80-89, 100-102, 117-118
(detailing Sri Lanka Army shelling in no-fire zones).
320.
Executive Summary to Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at ii.
321.
Id. at ii-iii; Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, Jf 124-25.
322.
See Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, 128 (stating that low estimates
resulted in severe shortages of food and medical supplies).
Id. IT 133, 137.
323.
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violations of international humanitarian and human rights law that
the UN Expert Panel that investigated the end of Sri Lanka's civil
war concluded: "[T]he conduct of the war represented a grave assault
on the entire regime of international law designed to protect
individual dignity during both war and peace." 324
There is little question that the Sri Lankan government was not
only the legitimate representative of the majority of the people during
its fight against the LTTE, but also that the majority supported its
activities. 325 There is also no question that the government not only
did not represent the Tamil population, but that it also breached its
duties to this minority group sufficiently that the international
community should have been forced to fulfill its responsibility to
protect. 3 26 The systematic targeting of civilians in the governmentproclaimed no-fly zone and at hospitals during the end of the war
certainly would have justified military intervention, along with all
other less invasive means of influencing Sri Lanka to protect
civilians. Through complicated political games, 32 7 the Sri Lankan
government managed to avoid anything more than criticism of its
behavior, so that not only did it fail its minority population, but so did
the international community.32 8 The fact that the majority supported
the government's actions did not legitimize its behavior and would
not justify granting the government sovereign rights with respect to

Executive Summary to Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, at ii.
324.
325.
Summary to VAUGHN, supra note 290.
Sri Lanka, INT'L COALITION RESP. PROTECT,
See
Crisis in
326.
(last visited Oct.
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-sri-lanka
18, 2012) (describing the extent of civilian death and ethnic-minority displacement, and
expressing disappointment in the lack of international response to the numerous calls
for coordinated action).
327.
Explanations for why countries refrained from taking any action to fulfill
their responsibility to protect range from Sri Lanka being able to exploit the post-9/11
climate to characterize its action as a legitimate part of the war on terror, to fear that if
the United Nations or other international NGOs were too openly critical of the
government, they would not be able to remain to help the civilians after the war, to a
fear of failure as anything short of military intervention was likely to be unsuccessful
as Sri Lanka would turn to China, Pakistan, Israel, and others to make up for any cut
off of aid or benefits . See Expert Panel Report, supra note 274, T 56 (discussing
diplomatic efforts to get support as part of the "war on terror" and to increase
collaboration with India); INT'L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REP. No. 206, INDIA AND SRI LANKA
AFTER THE LTTE 14 (2011) ("Global shifts in economic and political power have allowed
Sri Lanka not only to play China off against India but also to turn to others-such as
Pakistan, Iran and Libya-for support."); Jason Burke, Sri Lanka Unlikely To Face
War
Crimes
Investigation,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
26,
2011,
6:09
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldl2011/apr/26/un-sri-lanka-possible-war-crimes (stating
that "Sri Lanka's allies, particularly China and Russia, consistently protected the
government" against criticism regarding war crimes and civilian casualties, and that
China and Russia "are now likely to block any moves to continue investigations").
See INT'L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REP. No. 191, WAR CRIMES IN SRI LANKA 29-30
328.
(2010) ("UN agencies in Sri Lanka allowed themselves to be bullied by the government
and accepted a reduced role in protecting civilians . . . .").
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the Tamil community, although it was entitled to those rights with
respect to the Sinhalese population. Popular support for extreme
violations of the human rights of minorities does not justify them or
restrict international intervention into domestic affairs.
3.

Liberal Democracies

Liberal democracies also can face challenges to their entitlement
to claim sovereign rights for the same reasons as illiberal
democracies. Liberal democracies are associated with free and fair
elections, protection for and promotion of the rule of law, protection
for basic human rights, and neutrality toward the determination of
the common good. 329 Despite these promising characteristics, they
can violate the two criteria for retaining sovereign rights when the
will of the people, exercised by a majority of the population, supports
the violation of sovereign duties toward some members of the political
community.3 30 Picking up the discussion from Part III, democracies
risk creating a tyranny of the majority that excludes minority groups
from meaningful representation in the determination of the will and
common good of the people. Liberal democracies that suppress or
oppress their minority groups run afoul of both requirements for
retaining their sovereign rights.
France's current ban on the burqa-traditional Muslim clothing
consisting of a loose robe that also veils a woman's face-illustrates
this point. The ban violates France's duty to protect the rights to
freedom of expression, association, religion, equality, and equal
protection of the law of Muslim women who are prevented from
expressing their religious identity and from making personal
decisions on how to dress.33 1 The ban has been justified on three
grounds: (1) religious neutrality, (2) protection of Muslim women from
patriarchy, and (3) security. None of these justifications can
withstand closer scrutiny, highlighting the French government's
violation of its duties to Muslim women.
Laicite is the French term for secularism that forms official
policy to achieve religious neutrality, including through the removal

329.
Roger I. Zakheim, Note, Israel in the Human Rights Era: Finding a Moral
Justification for the Jewish State, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1005, 1011 (2004)
(citations omitted).
330.
See WEINERT, supra note 118, at 193 (citation omitted) ("I argue against
majority-based conceptions of democracy . . .. Democracy, to be coherent, must be
predicated on an objective valuation of human life and dignity, a valuation, moreover,
armed with an equally objective core of democratic goods.").
Much of the argument here was first made in Reining in France's
331.
Ethnocentrism, HUM. RTs. FEATURES, June 1, 2011, http://www.hrdc.net/
sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF215.pdf, a document that the author helped draft.
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of religious symbols from public spaces. 332 The burqa ban is part of
this policy that effectively hides any appearance of difference among
its citizens,33 3 which includes restrictions on women wearing
headscarves at citizenship naturalization ceremonies or in public
schools. 334 The larger driving force behind the ban, however, appears
to be the belief that the government needs to protect Muslim women
from the patriarchal control of their families. Then-President Nicolas
Sarkozy asserted that "[t]he burqa is not a religious sign, it is a sign
of the subjugation, of the submission of women. I want to say
solemnly that it will not be welcome on our territory."3 35 He
characterized the policy, which became law, as protecting women's
freedom and dignity.3 36 In doing so, he assumed that Muslim women
do not choose how to dress for themselves. He effectively replaced
what he considered religious patriarchy with the patriarchy of the
state. As a last effort to justify its discrimination against Muslim
women, the government claims that the burqa hinders security
efforts as it could permit a terrorist to hide in plain sight.3 37 This
motivation is highly suspect given that no similar ban has been
required for beards, baggy clothes, or a motorcycle helmet, which
could have the same effect.338
Read together, these "justifications suggest either that women
cannot or should not be allowed to make decisions for themselves on
something as personal as how to dress in public or that Muslim
women who wear a burqa are particularly dangerous."33 9 Bans on
Muslim women's dress have been perceived as "reinforce[ing] the
problem of discrimination or exclusion of Muslim women generally in
everyday life."340 There reportedly have been incidents of ordinary

332.
See Maurice Barbier, Pour une Difinition de la Laecit Frangaise[Towards
a Definition of French Secularism], 134 D9BAT 129 (2005) (Fr.), translated at
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0205-Barbier-GB.pdf (Gregory Elliott, trans.)
(stating that the main focus of secularism is "the exclusion of religion from the public
sphere" and stressing the importance of a new law restricting religious symbols in
schools).
333.
Reining in France'sEthnocentrism, supra note 331, at 1-2.
334.
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1675th Mtg., at 10,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR. 1675 (Feb. 28, 2005).
335.
Estelle Shirbon, Sarkozy Says Burqas Have No Place in France, REUTERS
(June 22, 2009, 12:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/22/us-francesarkozy-burqas-idUSTRE55L2YV20090622.
336.
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See Catherine Strawn, French ParliamentDebates Burqa Ban, ASSOCIATED
337.
PRESS (July 8, 2009), http://www.thefrisky.com/2009-07-08/french-parliament-debatesburqa-ban/ ("[T]he veils threaten security ... because they conceal the wearer's
identity.").
338.
Reining in France'sEthnocentrism, supra note 331, at 2.
339.
Id.
340.
European Comm. Against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI], ECRI Rep. on
France (Fourth Monitoring Cycle), 89, U.N. Doc. CRI(2010)16 (June 15, 2010),
available at http://www.unher.org/refworld/docid/4cl873142.html.
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citizens attempting to pull veils off women and bus drivers and shop
owners refusing the patronage of veiled women. 34 1 As one Muslim
woman articulated:
My quality of life has seriously deteriorated since the ban. In my head,
I have to prepare for war every time I step outside .... The politicians
claimed they were liberating us; what they've done is to exclude us from
the social sphere. Before this law, I never asked myself whether I'd be
able to make it to a cafe or collect documents from a town hall. One
politician in favour of the ban said niqabs were "walking prisons". Well,
342
that's exactly where we've been stuck by this law.

As this description of the impact of the burqa ban shows, the
French government has lost its legitimacy on the issue of religious
freedom and equality in the eyes of the target population of the law.
On this issue, it also has failed to meet the duties required to access
the sovereign right to be free from international intervention in
domestic affairs. The bigger question is whether the rights violations
pass the threshold test to justify international intervention as
described in Part III.C. The violation of Muslim women's rights is
certainly systemic and the harm caused is severe, as these women are
increasingly isolated and at times physically attacked. Thus
intervention is likely appropriate but would need to target the
particular area of rights violations. The intervention would likely be
restricted to criticism because most other options could not be limited
effectively to target only the particular harm caused by the burqa ban
and the outcome would not be proportionate with France's loss of
sovereign rights. This approach provides retroactive justification for
U.S. President Barack Obama's criticism of the ban in which he
stated: "[I]t is important for Western countries to avoid impeding
Muslim citizens from practicing religion as they see fit-for instance,
by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear. We cannot
disguise hostility towards any religion behind the pretence of
liberalism." 34 3
Part TV.A's discussion highlights that while democracy currently
helps determine the legitimacy of a government and democratic
rights form part of its duties to the sovereign people, being a
democracy will not always protect the people or its elected
representative from the loss of sovereign rights. Illiberal and liberal
democracies alike can run afoul of the two conditions required for

341.
Angelique Chrisafis, France's Burqa Ban: Women Are 'Effectively Under
House Arrest,' GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/201I/sep/19fbattle-for-the-burqa.
Id. (quoting an Afghan French woman who has experienced overt
342.
discrimination) (first level of internal quotation marks omitted).
343.
Barack Obama, President, Remarks at Cairo University (June 4, 2009),
available at http://www.usnews.comlnews/obamalarticles/2009/06/04/president-obamasspeech-to-the-muslim-world-at-cairo-university.
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entitlement to sovereign rights, even when the state's actions conform
to the will of the people and their vision for the common good. While
the people never lose their sovereign identity, they cannot deprive
themselves or others of fundamental rights; nor can they use their
electoral power to deprive a minority group of its rights. The people
are allowed to make choices that appear to be against their interests
when exercising sovereignty in the people, but they cannot use their
sovereign power in violation of the purposes of sovereignty in the
people.

V. CONCLUSION

Sovereignty is difficult to define, subject to numerous challenges
and qualifiers, and provokes open and widespread debate. Treating
sovereignty as a system for organizing domestic and international
politics to protect the security and common good of the individuals
who form a political community allows this Article to side-step much
of the unnecessary contentiousness of the topic while responding
pragmatically to governmental attempts to shield human rights
abuses from international rebuke by hiding behind sovereign rights.
For some, the concept of sovereignty has grown obsolete or is
inappropriate as a result of global interdependence, continuing strife
around the world, and the expectation that states will accord greater
respect to human rights and humanitarian norms at the expense of
remains
the
sovereignty
rights.
Pragmatically,
sovereign
international community's basis for determining whether and when
to intervene to stop human rights abuses in another country. For this
reason, sovereignty continues to be a relevant concept in the effort to
protect human rights.
Governments that attempt to use sovereign rights to tell the
international community to "mind its own business" when committing
domestic abuses misunderstand who is entitled to claim these rights.
Sovereignty lies with the people, as proclaimed by most state
constitutions and as protected by international law, including
possibly customary international law. Sovereignty in the people
means that the people are entitled to receive the benefits of sovereign
rights, not the government. The people may choose to authorize a
government as their representative, passing sovereign authority and
rights to it. The government, however, may exercise those rights only
on behalf of the people-never at their expense.
A government must meet two conditions to claim entitlement to
sovereign rights: (1) it must be legitimate and (2) it must fulfill its
duties as sovereign representative. A government retains legitimacy
if the people support it and it fairly represents the will and common
good of all the people, not just the majority. Only if a government
receives this internal legitimacy should foreign states provide it with
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external legitimacy and support. A government also is required to
fulfill its democratic and human rights-based duties to retain its
sovereign authority. Strong debates over the definition of
fundamental human rights complicates the determination of those
duties, which are likely to be subject to claims of cultural imperialism
and paternalism. Customary law, nonderogable rights, the doctrine of
responsibility to protect, international criminal law, and state
constitutions, at this stage, are the easiest sources for avoiding these
complaints but create only a narrow and conservative list of rights
that form part of the government's sovereign duties. The rights
described as duties in Part III.B.2 require further development to
account for the concerns of all the world's people and not just those of
the developed countries or of governments working to retain their
power.
A government that fails to meet the legitimacy requirement or
fulfill its sovereign duties by committing systematic human rights
violations with impunity loses some or all of its sovereign rights. The
amount of sovereignty lost is proportionate to the severity of the
human rights abuses. Once some or all sovereignty is lost, foreign
states are permitted to intervene on behalf of the people to help them
reclaim sovereign authority from their abusive governments.
Intervention bolsters sovereignty as long as it is undertaken on
behalf of the people with their consent, is proportionate to the amount
of sovereignty lost, and does more good than harm to the people.
This leads to the two most contentious points of this Article,
which are the logical conclusions to sovereignty in the people: (1) a
government can lose sovereign entitlements for violations of human
rights that do not rise to the level of mass atrocities, and (2) like all
other forms of government, democratic governments risk losing their
sovereign rights for failure to meet the two conditions of sovereign
authority. The first point is contentious because governments as well
as historically disadvantaged political communities fear that revoking
sovereign rights for anything less than mass atrocities allows for
unfettered interference in their states. The determination of when a
government loses some or all of its sovereignty and when and to what
extent a government can intervene, as advocated here, is based on
standards of fairness and proportionality consistent with current
international practice. This Article's conception of sovereignty in the
people justifies current government practice; it does not supplant
it. 3 4 4 It further explains how current practices, when implemented

344.
See generally Council of the
2005, Guidelines on Implementation
(Sanctions) in the Framework of the
(explaining the European Union's
implementation of sanctions).

European Union (EU) No. 15114/05 of 2 Dec.
and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
practices and procedures regarding the

2013]

RETURNING SOVEREIGNTY TO THE PEOPLE

169

do not violate
requirements,
under strict proportionality
sovereignty. 345
Democratic governments are likely to protest this Article's
second conclusion, arguing that elected governments always reflect
the will of the people and therefore retain the authority to claim
sovereign rights. Free and fair elections, however, do not guarantee
that a government will meet the legitimacy requirement or fulfill its
duties to the people. The government must act in accordance with the
will of the people and their vision of the common good once elections
are completed. This requirement is much more complex than it first
appears because the will and common good must be informed by the
needs and interests of all the people and not simply the majority.
Minority groups must have a voice in this determination or
democracy will oppress them, negating legitimacy and causing the
government to fail at its duties at least with respect to some portion
of the population. This does not mean the people cannot act against
their own best interests; instead, they cannot act in violation of
sovereign duties when attempting to claim sovereign rights. The
people are not permitted to do what the government cannot do.
Sovereignty in the people conceptually ensures the people always
remain the government's source of power and that sovereign
authority, representation, and rights are always exercised on behalf
of the people. More problematic is turning this concept into consistent
practice.

But see, e.g., Cohan, supra note 17, at 954 ("Humanitarian intervention is a
345.
clear intrusion into the offending state [sic] sovereignty, for it not only seeks to impose
top-down standards that may abrogate a state [sic] domestic policies, but it also may
entail military occupation or even a regime change.").
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